# 1NC

### 1

#### Obama pushing immigration reform – it’ll pass.

Houston Chronicle 2-13-13. blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2013/02/analysis-obama-makes-the-economic-case-for-immigration-reform/

President Barack Obama cast immigration reform in economic terms Tuesday as he prodded Congress to create a path for citizenship for undocumented immigrants and provide employers with highly skilled workers needed to compete globally.¶ “Our economy is stronger when we harness the talents and ingenuity of striving, hopeful immigrants,” Obama said to a standing ovation and applause from a joint session of Congress.¶ Obama seized on the political momentum and used his State of the Union speech to praise lawmakers in the Senate and House for working together on the emotionally charged issue.¶ “Send me a comprehensive immigration reform bill in the next few months and I will sign it right away,” he said.¶ In the Republican rebuttal, Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a co-author of a bipartisan Senate immigration measure, agreed with the president that the immigration system needs fixing.¶ Rubio said we can help “our economy grows if we have a legal immigration system that allows us to attract and assimilate the world’s best and brightest.”¶ He stopped short of endorsing a path to citizenship while calling for “a responsible, permanent solution to the problem of those who are here illegally.”¶ And, Rubio said: “We must first follow through on the broken promises of the past to secure our borders and enforce our laws.”¶ The president’s speech comes one day before the Senate Judiciary Committee takes up the bipartisan comprehensive immigration reform plan.¶ Sweeping legislation still faces hurdles, particularly in the Republican-controlled House.¶ “Illegal immigration is a drain on the economy and amnesty is not the answer,” said Rep. Lamar Smith, R-San Antonio, a member of the House Judiciary subcommittee on immigration.¶ Smith said that amnesty “actually makes matters worse by providing an incentive for more immigrants to come to the U.S. illegally.”¶ Tuesday night, the president said immigration reform would benefit the economy by leveling the playing field for both workers and employers.¶ He called on Congress to streamline the legal immigration system for families, workers and to attract highly skilled entrepreneurs and engineers who will create jobs.¶ Obama said immigration reform should include border security, building upon the progress of his administration, which increased the number of Border Patrol agents and saw illegal crossing on the Southwest border plunge to the lowest levels in 40 years.¶ And he called for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants who pass background checks, pay taxes, learn English and stand at “the back of the line behind the folks trying to come here legally.”¶ The speech was applauded by congressional Democrats elected on vows to reform immigration laws.¶ “I’m glad immigration reform was a focal point of tonight’s speech,” said Rep. Pete Gallego, D-Alpine. “Immigration reform is the right thing to do for our country and a necessity for America’s economic future.”¶ Rep. Joaquin Castro, D-San Antonio, said Obama “is putting his full weight behind immigration reform. I think the president’s efforts are paying off.”

#### Natural gas is politically explosive

Mantius, 11 – DC Bureau staff

(Peter, "Cuomos Hydrofracking Honeymoon Ends July 1," DC Bureau, 6-30-11, l/n, accessed 9-2-12, mss)

Throughout his first legislative session, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo had the luxury of sitting on the fence on the **politically explosive** question of whether or not his state can safely open its borders to a **controversial** natural gas drilling technique. During that grace period, Cuomo successfully backed gay marriage, watched his approval rating soar above 60 percent and heard buzz about his potential as a 2016 presidential candidate. But the honeymoon ends July 1 when the state Department of Environmental Conservation releases its latest draft of requirements for permits to use high volume hydraulic fracturing when drilling in New Yorks Marcellus Shale formation. According to The New York Times, the Cuomo administration will lift what has been a moratorium on hydraulic fracturing. The governor bought time in the first half of 2011 by insisting that experts at the DEC “not politicians “ write the rules for gas drilling. To address criticism that the DECs previous draft rules on hydrofracking were inadequate, Cuomo, in one of his first acts as governor, gave the agency a quick makeover. He appointed Joseph Martens as DEC commissioner and then turned his attention to other matters. œCuomo made a point of saying that he and Martens had actually never spoken on hydrofracking, said Roger Downs of the Sierra Clubs Atlantic Chapter. œHe wanted a firewall. Meanwhile, New Yorks Republican-controlled Senate took a rigid stance against passing gas drilling legislation in the 2011 session before the DEC issued its latest version of gas drilling rules. That meant that three bills that passed the Democratically-controlled Assembly “ a moratorium on fracking the New York Marcellus until next summer, a œhome rule measure guaranteeing the rights of communities to ban hydrofracking, and a bill to end the oil and gas industrys exemption from rules applying to hazardous waste “ all died quietly in the Senate. Everything was left hanging on the DECs revised rules, due July 1. Those rules are spelled out in a supplemental generic environmental impact statement, or SGEIS. The agency intends to allow drillers to cite the document instead of developing their own environmental impact statements for each gas well they drill, a process that has the potential to greatly speed up the well permitting process. The DECs previous draft of the SGEIS drew criticism from not only environmental groups, but also government agencies such as the federal Environmental Protection Agency, the New York State Department of Health and the New York City Department of Environmental Protection. Critics tended to focus on the drafts scant attention to the cumulative impact of hundreds, if not thousands, of hydrofracked wells and the failure to comprehensively address the regions lack of capacity to deal with millions of gallons of contaminated well flowback water.

#### CIR is key to the economy – capital injection, work force, tax base

Ojeda 12 (Raul Hinojosa, “The Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform”) http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/2012/1/cj32n1-12.pdf

The results of our modeling suggest that comprehensive immigration reform would increase U.S. GDP by at least 0.84 percent per year. Using 10-year GDP projections prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, this translates into a steadily increasing amount of added annual GDP over the coming decade. The 10-year total is at least $1.5 trillion in added GDP, which includes roughly $1.2 trillion in additional consumption and $256 billion in additional investment. Comprehensive immigration reform brings substantial economic gains even in the short run—during the first three years following legalization. The real wages of newly legalized workers increase by roughly $4,400 per year among those in less-skilled jobs during the first three years of implementation, and $6,185 per year for those in higher-skilled jobs. The higher earning power of newly legalized workers translates into an increase in net personal income of $30 billion to $36 billion, which would generate $4.5 to $5.4 billion in additional net tax revenue nationally, enough to support 750,000 to 900,000 new jobs.

**Economic downturn causes great power wars and extinction.**

**AUSLIN ‘9** - scholar at American Enterprise Institute (Michael, “The global Economy Unravels” American Enterprise Institute, [http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.29502/pub\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all%2CpubID.29502/pub_detail.asp))

What do these trends mean in the short and medium term? The Great Depression showed how social and global chaos followed hard on economic collapse. The mere fact that parliaments across the globe, from America to Japan, are unable to make responsible, economically sound recovery plans suggests that they do not know what to do and are simply hoping for the least disruption. Equally worrisome is the adoption of more statist economic programs around the globe, and the concurrent decline of trust in free-market systems. The threat of instability is a pressing concern. China, until last year the world's fastest growing economy, just reported that 20 million migrant laborers lost their jobs. Even in the flush times of recent years, China faced upward of 70,000 labor uprisings a year. A sustained downturn poses grave and possibly immediate threats to Chinese internal stability. The regime in Beijing may be faced with a choice of repressing its own people or diverting their energies outward, leading to conflict with China's neighbors. Russia, an oil state completely dependent on energy sales, has had to put down riots in its Far East as well as in downtown Moscow. Vladimir Putin's rule has been predicated on squeezing civil liberties while providing economic largesse. If that devil's bargain falls apart, then wide-scale repression inside Russia, along with a continuing threatening posture toward Russia's neighbors, is likely. **Even** apparently **stable societies** face increasing risk and the threat of internal or possibly external conflict. As Japan's exports have plummeted by nearly 50%, one-third of the country's prefectures have passed emergency economic stabilization plans. Hundreds of thousands of temporary employees hired during the first part of this decade are being laid off. Spain's unemployment rate is expected to climb to nearly 20% by the end of 2010; Spanish unions are already protesting the lack of jobs, and the specter of violence, as occurred in the 1980s, is haunting the country. Meanwhile, in Greece, workers have already taken to the streets. Europe as a whole will face dangerously increasing tensions between native citizens and immigrants, largely from poorer Muslim nations, who have increased the labor pool in the past several decades. Spain has absorbed five million immigrants since 1999, while nearly 9% of Germany's residents have foreign citizenship, including almost 2 million Turks. The xenophobic labor strikes in the U.K. do not bode well for the rest of Europe. A prolonged global downturn, let alone a collapse, would dramatically raise tensions inside these countries. Couple that with possible protectionist legislation in the United States, unresolved ethnic and territorial disputes in all regions of the globe and a loss of confidence that world leaders actually know what they are doing. The result may be a series of small explosions that **coalesce into a big bang**

### 2

**US-Russia cooperation is strong over Arctic energy, which is key to smooth overall relations- the plan derails it**

**Weitz 1-29**-13 [Richard Weitz is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor, “Global Insights: Oil Sector a Challenge for Russia, Opportunity for U.S.,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12672/global-insights-oil-sector-a-challenge-for-russia-opportunity-for-u-s]

U.S.-based multinationals have the capital and technologies to help Russia exploit its Arctic riches. Meanwhile, the small and medium-sized American companies that revolutionized and revitalized U.S. oil production could bring the same technologies and management skills to Russia. ¶ To attract these companies, which could conceivably invest in other regions in Russia as well, the Russian government needs to create a more attractive investment climate. This would include legal, fiscal and regulatory reforms that establish a more competitive and transparent domestic market. In particular, the reforms must give tax breaks for energy companies that invest in new fields and technologies; encourage restructuring of the Russian oil industry to make it more innovative; reduce corruption and bureaucracy; and insure that property rights are better protected.¶ The United States would also benefit from a newly cooperative energy arrangement. In a recent paper, Rawi Abdelal of Harvard Business School and Tatiana Mitrova of the Moscow School of Management highlighted the fact that, despite their comprehensive bilateral relationship and the large role Russia and the United States play in global energy issues, the two countries cooperate very little in the hydrocarbon sector. ¶ In the view of Russians interviewed by the authors, this paucity of cooperation results from perceived impediments erected by the U.S. government. Similarly, Russian officials see the shale gas revolution as a conspiracy on the part of the United States to undermine Russia’s role in energy markets.¶ Absent forward momentum, the Russia-U.S. energy relationship might even deteriorate. The United States could soon become a major energy exporter again, which would lead to direct energy sales competition between Russia and the United States for the first time in history. One major opportunity for enhanced partnership, as opposed to competition, is the deal reached last August between Exxon Mobil and Rosneft. The project has only recently begun the preliminary seismic surveys, technical assessments and environmental studies that would allow any substantial drilling to start. ¶ Bringing the project to fruition, and augmenting it with near-term cooperation on tight oil and other energy projects, is important for both sides. Concrete Russia-U.S. energy collaboration could help dispel mutual misconceptions and perhaps spur U.S. and Russian economic cooperation in other areas. That in turn could help to increase the number of stakeholders in both countries that share an interest in maintaining good relations. These kinds of private-sector ties, as much as political will in Washington and Moscow, will contribute to the health of bilateral ties moving forward.

**The plan disrupts the cooperative framework- destroys relations**

**Sergunin and Konyshev ‘12** [Alexander Sergunin¶ Doctor of Political Science, Professor, St. Petersburg State University¶ Valery Konyshev¶ Doctor of Political Science, Professor, St. Petersburg State University, “US Arctic Strategy,” July 6, http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id\_4=584#top]

However, relations between the United States and Russia have significant potential for cooperation in the Arctic. According to experts, such relations are based on the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the “Arctic five” in May 2008, which states that the Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 was recognized as the legal basis for drawing borders, and that the parties intended to resolve problems through negotiations. In keeping with the general aspirations of Barack Obama to restart relations with Russia, there were statements including that of the U.S. President himself and Secretary of State on U.S. intentions to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic. However, it is likely that cooperation will only be in those areas where the USA. cannot do without Russian participation.¶ In particular, this concerns measures on ensuring the safety of water and air transportation in the Arctic, on which Member States of the Arctic Council signed an Agreement in May 2011. Each of the signatories undertook to build forces and resources to ensure safety in its segment and rapid exchange of information.¶ There is plan for a large-scale cooperation in the development of the resources of the Arctic zone of Russia. Rosneft and Exxon-Mobil – Russian and American companies, respectively – in April 2012 signed an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and development of oil and gas deposits in the Kara Sea.¶ Russia benefits from attracting the needed financial resources (Exxon-Mobil has capitalization of $400 billion) and modern technologies for exploration and drilling in the northern latitudes. Rosneft and ConocoPhillips, an American multinational energy corporation, are implementing another joint project at Nenets Autonomous District where they are developing the promising Ardalinskoye field. The American party is expected to increase investments.¶ Another direction of bilateral cooperation is the development of transantarctic routes for flights, involving development of communications infrastructure and maintenance, upgrade and construction of new airports in Russia. This airline market segment is the fastest growing.¶ Cooperation between the United States and Russia in the scientific study and nature conservation activities in the Arctic was and remains mutually beneficial. It is obvious that any decisions relating to the economic development of the Far North should be based on scientific analysis of the vulnerability of the northern nature and difficult weather, social, domestic and other conditions. In this respect, Russia can offer icebreaking fleet and its rich experience in Arctic expeditions.¶ At present, it is difficult to predict how relations between the United States and Russia in the Arctic will develop. This will depend, first, on **the general mood in Russian-American relations**, which may change if Republicans come to power in the USA. Secondly, it will depend on the effectiveness of Russia’s economic policy in the Arctic on attracting foreign investments and technology. Some positive steps have already been taken in this regard. Thirdly, it **will depend on whether the US will maintain** its present course of predominantly **unilateral action** in the region, **or** whether it will **opt for multilateral cooperation**.

**Relations solve multiple extinction scenarios**

**Tayler ’08** [Jeffrey, Russia correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly and a contributor to several other magazines as well as to NPR's All Things Considered, “Medvedev Spoils the Party,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/11/medvedev-spoils-the-party/7130/>]

Like it or not, the United States cannot solve crucial global problems without Russian participation. Russia commands the largest landmass on earth; possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, and other natural resources; owns huge stockpiles of weapons and plutonium; and still wields a potent brain trust. Given its influence in **Iran and North Korea**, to say nothing of its potential as a spoiler of international equilibrium elsewhere, Russia is one country with which the United States would do well to reestablish a strong working relationship—a strategic partnership, even—regardless of its feelings about the current Kremlin government. The need to do so trumps expanding NATO or pursuing “full-spectrum dominance.” Once the world financial crisis passes, we will find ourselves returning to worries about **resource depletion**, **environmental degradation**, and **global warming** – the greatest challenges facing humanity. **No country can confront these problems alone**. For the United States, **Russia** may just prove the “**indispensable nation”** with which to face a volatile future arm in arm.

### 3

#### Their use of security is articulated through gendered binaries—that requires domination and elimination of those who threaten the dominant masculine body politic

Wilcox 3 [Lauren, PhD in IR @ University of Minnesota, BA @ Macalester College, MA @ London School of Economics, “Security Masculinity: The Gender-Security Nexus”, RCB]

Post-structuralists emphasize not only the discursive process of securitization, but the ways in which issues of identity factor into this process. ”Practicing security‘ entails specific state actions not just in external policies, but in internal politics as well. By labeling external threats, the state constructs a regime of identity by demarcating who and what is to be feared by ”us.‘ ”Security‘ implies not only specific actions, but specific implications for the identity of what is being ”secured‘. David Campbell argues in Writing Security: American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, that security is the raison d‘être of the state. He further notes hat—the state requires discourses of ”danger‘ to provide a new theology about who and what ”we‘ are by highlighting who or what ”we‘ are not, and what ”we‘ have to fear.“10 Thus, the process of ”securitizing‘ can also be a process to define a nation‘s identity by drawing boundaries between who and what is acceptable (on the ”inside‘) and what is unacceptable (on the ”outside‘). ”Security‘ is implicated in the production of dichotomies that structure the discipline and the way we think about international relations, such as inside/outside, self/other, us/them and sovereignty/anarchy. Much of this type of language was used in reference to terrorist and immigration, including the creation of a hierarchy between ”us‘ and ”them,‘ the criminalization and militarized responses, fears of internal subversion, and the discursive location of threats being outside the territory of the US.My understanding of ”security‘ and ”gender‘ is rooted in feminist contributions to international relations and security studies as well. Feminist scholarship informs my work in many ways, as feminist theorists, like critical theorists, attempt to, —make strange what has previously appeared familiar [and] to challenge us to question what has hitherto appeared as ”natural.‘ “11 Of key importance to this specific study are feminist scholars of IR who take the post-structuralist analysis further, and note how the dichotomies that constitute the field of international relations are so readily ”mapped onto‘ gender. Feminist scholar Charlotte Hooper‘s analysis of the gendered nature of the field of international relations is similar to Campbell‘s, noting how dichotomies such as active/passive, war/peace, and order/anarchy are assigned masculine and feminine traits, with the first being valued over the second. This use of the concept of gender is consistent with how ”gender‘ is used in this paper. The insights feminist post-structuralists provide into the gendered nature of the process of drawing borders between ”us‘ and ”them‘ and ”domestic‘ and ”foreign‘ are particularly relevant in the context of my research into the securitization of immigration and terrorism, as the discourses used in this context have clearly made these distinctions. They are also gendered discourses, as they rely on gendered dichotomies. My analysis of the gendered discourses of terrorism and immigration is based on this type of post-structuralist feminist analysis.Because of the prevalence of gendered dichotomies in IR and their role in constructing identities and boundaries, the practice of international relations and ”security‘ is inextricably linked to identity formation. Feminist scholars of international relations have noted the extensive association of masculinity and war, and have analyzed how war and IR and masculinities have been mutually constructed though military service, 12 and by several different kinds of ”hegemonic masculinities‘ that serve as the prototypical behavior for men indifferent contexts.13When writing of ”gender,‘ I want to make clear I do not equate this term to ”men and women‘ (or just women for that matter) but, as a system of asymmetrical social constructs of masculinity and femininity.14 While employing a gender analysis of issues such as militarization, war, and terrorism, I will not be addressing such issues as whether or not men or women are inherently violent or peaceful, or, in response to Francis Fukuyama, what would happen if women were our political leaders.15 Rather, I use to concept of gender as a symbolic system organizes many cultural discourses, and is mapped on to certain dichotomies, such as hard/soft, inside/outside, sovereignty/anarchy, active/passive, as I briefly explained above. As gender is a normative system in which the concept associated with masculinity in the dichotomy is considered more desirable, gender in International Relations also serves as a prescriptive formulation. This is not say that actual men and women are irrelevant to gender, but that gender as a discursive system represents men and women differently, and constructs different social spaces and functions for them. Race, class, and other variables are also part of a gender discourse that represents a feminine ”other‘ that deviates from the masculine ”norm‘. The concept of ”hegemonic masculinity‘ is also related to the concept of gender. This term, which is discussed at length in chapter three, indicates the prevailing definition of masculinity, driven by social and political trends and defined against subordinate masculinities, such as racial minorities and non-heterosexual orientations.

#### The impact is Extinction

**Warren and Cady 94**—Warren is the Chair of the Philosophy Department at Macalester College and Cady is Professor of Philosophy at Hamline University (Karen and Duane, “Feminism and Peace: Seeing Connections”, p. 16, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3810167.pdf)

Operationalized, the evidence of patriarchy as a dysfunctional system is found in the behaviors to which it gives rise, (c), and the unmanageability, (d), which results. For example, in the United States, current estimates are that one out of every three or four women will be raped by someone she knows; globally, rape, sexual harassment, spouse-beating, and sado-masochistic pornography are examples of behaviors practiced, sanctioned, or tolerated within patriarchy. In the realm of environmentally destructive behaviors, strip-mining, factory farming, and pollution of the air, water, and soil are instances of behaviors maintained and sanctioned within patriarchy. They, too, rest on the faulty beliefs that it is okay to "rape the earth," that it is "man's God-given right" to have dominion (that is, domination) over the earth, that nature has only instrumental value, that environmental destruction is the acceptable price we pay for "progress."And the presumption of warism, that war is a natural, righteous, and ordinary way to impose dominion on a people or nation, goes hand in hand with patriarchy and leads to dysfunctional behaviors of nations and ultimately to international unmanageability. Much of the current" unmanageability" of contemporary life in patriarchal societies, (d), is then viewed as a consequence of a patriarchal preoccupation with activities, events, and experiences that reflect historically male-gender identified beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions. Included among these real-life consequences are precisely those concerns with **nuclear proliferation, war, environmental destruction, and violence toward women**, which many feminists see as the logical outgrowth of patriarchal thinking. In fact, it is often only through observing these dysfunctional behaviors-the symptoms of dysfunctionality that one can truly see that and how patriarchy serves to maintain and perpetuate them. When patriarchy is understood as a dysfunctional system, this "unmanageability" can be seen for what it is-as a predictable and thus logical consequence of patriarchy.'1 The theme that global environmental crises, war, and violence generally are predictable and logical consequences of sexism and patriarchal culture is pervasive in ecofeminist literature (see Russell 1989, 2). Ecofeminist Charlene Spretnak, for instance, argues that "militarism and warfare are continual features of a patriarchal society because they reflect and instill patriarchal values and fulfill needs of such a system. Acknowledging the context of patriarchal conceptualizations that feed militarism is a first step toward reducing their impact and preserving life on Earth" (Spretnak 1989, 54). Stated in terms of the foregoing model of patriarchy as a dysfunctional social system, the claims by Spretnak and other feminists take on a clearer meaning: Patriarchal conceptual frameworks legitimate impaired thinking (about women, national and regional conflict, the environment) which is manifested in behaviors which, if continued, **will make life on earth difficult, if not impossible**. It is a stark message, but it is plausible. Its plausibility lies in understanding the conceptual roots of various woman-nature-peace connections in regional, national, and global contexts.

**Vote Neg to reject the 1AC. The act interrupts the hegemonic masculinity inherent in the 1AC**

**Beland 2009**

Daniel Beland. “Gender, Ideational Analysis, and Social Policy” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society. Vol 16 Num 4. Pp 558-581. Winter 2009

To further illustrate the role of frames in politics and policy change, let me discuss three ways in which political actors can mobilize them. First, **frames can take the form of a public discourse used by speciﬁc political actors to convince others that policy change is necessary.** This is what political scientist Robert H. Cox (2001) calls “the social construction of the need to reform” and what politi- cal philosopher Nancy Fraser (1989) has called the “politics of needs interpretation.” From this perspective, **discursive frames can help convince political actors and the general public that existing policy legacies are ﬂawed, and that reforms should be enacted to solve perceived social and economic problems.** Thus, **policy learning can feed framing processes in the sense that experts, ofﬁcials, and interest groups can publicly voice their negative assessments of exist- ing policies to convince other actors that the time has come to improve or even replace them.** But “social learning remains analyti- cally distinct from framing activities in part because learning can occur without the emergence of a public discourse about the need to reform. An autonomous set of evaluative activities, social learning generally predates and, in only some cases, informs framing pro- cesses” (Be´ land 2006, 562). Overall, **discursive frames help actors make a case for policy change, and this activity generally involves a public discussion of the meaning and performance of existing policy legacies.** Second, **these frames help political actors convince other groups and individuals to form a coalition around a concrete proposal or vision for change.** As discussed above, ideational processes partici- pate in the construction of interests and the ranking of policy goals. In this context, **particular political actors can use frames and politi- cal discourse to inﬂuence the way other actors see their interests and identify with shared policy goals.** From this perspective, **policy debates are largely about the construction of interests, policy goals, and identities, without which political coalitions can hardly survive.** Although concrete quid pro quos between key political actors are a major aspect of coalition building (Bonoli 2000), **frames can help sell concrete policy alternatives to the public and build a stronger coalition around them.** On one hand, politicians can “speak to their base” and argue that the measures they support are consistent with the broad ideological principles that cement their existing coalition. On the other hand, ambiguous policy ideas and proposals can make many different actors believe that they have an interest in supporting a complex policy alternative, which can lead to seemingly paradoxi- cal coalitions (Palier 2005). Third, political actors can mobilize framing processes to counter criticism targeting the policy alternatives they support. Thus, one might expand Weaver’s notion of blame avoidance strategies (Weaver 1986) to take on a discursive form. For instance, ofﬁcials may blame economic cycles for higher unemployment rates to con- vince the public that their decisions are not at the origin of this negative situation. **Policymakers can also frame policy alternatives in a way that diverts attention away from their actual departure from well-accepted political symbols or policy paradigms.** For example, since the 1980s, Swedish politicians have referred to enduringly popular idea of “social democracy” to legitimize forms of policy change that are arguably closer to neoliberalism than to traditional social democratic ideals (Cox 2004). Blame avoidance frames such as these have a preventive component because political actors use them to shield the policy alternatives they support from criticism (Be´ land 2005, 11). **Scholars interested in the gender – social policy nexus have long analyzed discursive and framing processes** (Tannen 1994), and their potential impact on policy change (Lewis 2002). A good example of this type of scholarship is the research of Hobson and Lindholm (1997) on the mobilization of Swedish women during the 1930s. In order to understand this mobilization, the authors bridge the power resource approach and the sociological scholarship on social movements. **Their analysis of women’s mobilization emphasizes the role of what they call “discursive resources,” a concept that “acknowledges that social groups engage in struggles over the mean- ings and the boundaries of political and social citizenship. This includes the cultural narratives and metaphors that social actors exploit in their public representations as well as the contesting ideological stances that they take on dominant themes and issues on the political agenda.”** (Hobson and Lindholm 1997, 479) For these two scholars, **ideational processes clearly serve as powerful framing tools in struggles over gender and social policy change.** Once again, **this discussion of the gender scholarship points to the relationship between ideational processes and categorical inequalities, a major issue that is frequently overlooked in the general ideational literature on policy and politics. By pointing to this key relationship, students of gender and social policy make a strong and original contribution to this ideational literature.**

### 4

#### The United States Federal Government should establish an Arctic Forum for Arctic regional security dialogue.

#### The United States federal government should pass the Responsible Helium Administration and Stewardship Act.

#### Solves safe drilling- we can instruct countries to drill safely which solves their

#### Solves the terminal impacts

**Perry and Andersen 12** (<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf>, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration, February 2012, Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen. Dr. Perry is vice president and director of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., and vice president of National Security Planning Associates, Inc. Dr. Perry also directs and/or contributes to a number of Institute studies that focus on specific aspects of U.S. defense reform and military transformation to meet post-9/11 security challenges. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Bobby Anderson is a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. She focuses on Nordic affairs, NATO and European security issues, U.S. defense strategy, regional security developments in the Asia-Pacific, changing security dynamics in the Arctic region.)

One idea for strengthening the security policy component of the Arctic Council would be for NATO to follow the EU’s lead in seeking permanent observer status on the council. That way NATO, in accordance with the 127 Ibid. 128 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North.” Arctic Council Plus formula, could participate more directly in council discussions that could benefit from a broader regional security perspective. It is also possible that a new multilateral mechanism could be established to facilitate Arctic-wide discussions of emerging security concerns and military challenges. In that regard, promoting and developing an informal, unofficial forum for an Arctic-oriented security dialogue – similar perhaps to the annual Munich Security Conference in Germany and the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore – might be an ideal way forward. Just as the Munich session does for European security and the Singapore session for Asia-Pacific security, an Arctic forum along similar lines, hosted perhaps by one of the Arctic Five (or rotated among them), could provide an authoritative venue where recognized experts and senior officials dealing with Arctic security matters could come together on a regular basis to discuss security challenges in the Arctic region, but do so in an unofficial setting free from the constraints and sensitivities often associated with more formal and official diplomatic exchanges. Indeed, given the traditional reluctance of the Arctic Five to address security policy issues at the Arctic Council, such a forum, which could be open to all parties interested in contributing to a stable and secure Arctic region, is long overdue.

**Solves the case and prevents a helium shortage**

**Bonner 2/8/13** (Loren, “Bipartisan Bill Introduced to Save U.S. Helium Supply”)

Members of the House Committee on Natural Resources have introduced a bipartisan bill into Congress that would keep the Federal Helium Reserve open, a global supply of helium that's critical to manufacturing and running MRI scanners. By law, the reserve is supposed to close later this year when the government is required to sell it off by 2015 in an effort to pay down the system's debts. But it should be able to pay off the debt by October 2013 instead — earlier than expected — without having sold off all the helium. The Responsible Helium Administration and Stewardship Act (H.R. 527), introduced on Wednesday, prevents a premature closure of the reserve, which supplies 30 percent of the world's helium supply. The bill is also intended to ensure taxpayers get a fair price for helium sold by the Bureau of Land Management since the market price of helium has risen higher than the federal government pricing formula in recent years. Without immediate reforms the world will soon face a global helium shortage, which will threaten tens of thousands of American jobs, make life-saving medical devices unreliable and disrupt national defense efforts," said Rep. Doc Hastings (R-Wash.), chairman of the committee, in a prepared statement. The bipartisan bill spells out a three-part approach for operating the reserve over the next decade — the estimated time it will take for the helium to be emptied out. The first phase is to let the Federal Helium Reserve continue operating under current law until one year after the date of enactment of the new law; phase two sets up a quarterly helium auction to promote competition and ensure a better return for taxpayers; and the final phase leaves the remaining helium — starting when there is 3 billion cubic feet of it left — available only for national security and scientific needs. The Medical Imaging & Technology Alliance (MITA), an OEM lobby, applauded the bill for presenting a solution to the problem. Gail Rodriguez, executive director of MITA said: "Failure to preserve our domestic helium supply will have reverberating effects on medical imaging manufacturers as well as the entire health care industry, as manufacturing facilities will have no choice but to slow or shut down production and physicians will be forced to turn away patients due to the shortage." The last bill aimed at extending the life of the reserve slipped through the cracks during a congressional "lame duck" session last year and expired when the 113th Congress began on Jan. 1, 2013.

### Artic

**No Arctic conflict**

**Perry and Andersen ‘12** [Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen. Dr. Perry is vice president and director of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., and vice president of National Security Planning Associates, Inc. Dr. Perry also directs and/or contributes to a number of Institute studies that focus on specific aspects of U.S. defense reform and military transformation to meet post-9/11 security challenges. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Bobby Anderson is a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. She focuses on Nordic affairs, NATO and European security issues, U.S. defense strategy, regional security developments in the Asia-Pacific, changing security dynamics in the Arctic region, “New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration,” February, <http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf>]

As the polar ice cap continues to melt, giving way to new and ever larger waterways in the Arctic, the world is witnessing nothing less than the opening of a new ocean, something that has not occurred on Earth since the end of the Ice Age. As if its creation were not newsworthy enough, this new, fifth ocean – which will essentially be an expanded and more navigable version of the Arctic Ocean that now exists – holds out the promise as well of new seaways linking Europe and Asia via the High North that could, in the view of numerous maritime experts, substantially reduce travel distances, transit times, and overall transportation costs by the 2030–35 timeframe.1 Adding to the Arctic’s importance even before then is the prospective extraction of significant strategic mineral supplies from the northernmost territories – especially those offshore in the Arctic seabed – of Norway, Russia, Denmark, Canada, and the United States, commonly referred to as the Arctic Five. Most prominent in this context are the Arctic’s oil and gas supplies that are currently projected to account for upwards of 22 percent of the world’s undiscovered but technically recoverable hydrocarbon reserves, the development of which will become increasingly feasible and cost-effective over the next decade. Indeed, for this reason alone, the Arctic Five have quickened their efforts to extend their sovereignty over extended continental shelves (ECS’s)2 where some of the most promising deposits are believed to be located, while other countries with a strong interest (but no territorial claim) in the Arctic and its resource riches – including distant, but energy-hungry economic powerhouses like China, Japan, and South Korea – do their best to retain access to the Arctic and to avoid being marginalized in policy debates over its future. That said, time, cost, and technology constraints appear to be working against any competitive “rush to the Arctic” fueled in part by the lure of an oil and gas bonanza beyond compare along the lines suggested by a number of the more popular studies on Arctic dynamics published in recent years.3 Far more likely is a slow and methodical push into the High North, not the least because there is so much yet to learn (or, in some cases, to relearn) about operating safely in the harsh Arctic landscape, so little infrastructure already (or soon to be) in place to support such operations, and such limited capacity even among the Arctic Five to undertake and sustain Arctic operations of any kind, be they commercial or military in nature. Moreover, while access to – if not control over – offshore Arctic resources remains a strategic goal shared by quite a few influential countries located both within and beyond the Arctic region, the probability of serious interstate rivalry or, in the worst case, open conflict in pursuit of this objective seems quite low, at least in the near- to mid-term future. In the first place, the vast majority of hydrocarbon deposits locked in the Arctic seabed are concentrated within the sovereign territory of one or another of the Arctic Five, where ownership is clear and undisputed. Secondly, while there are disagreements over who owns various resourcerich areas where two or more exclusive economic zones (EEZs)4 and potential ECS’s appear to overlap, the 2010 3 See, for example, Alun Anderson, After the Ice: Life, Death, and Geopolitics in the New Arctic (New York: Smithsonian Books, 2009); David Fairhall, Cold Front: Conflict Ahead in Arctic Waters (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2010); Roger Howard, The Arctic Gold Rush: The New Race for Tomorrow’s Natural Resources (London and New York: Continuum, 2009); and Richard Sale and Eugene Potapov, The Scramble for the Arctic: Ownership, Exploitation and Conflict in the Far North (London: Frances Lincoln, 2010). 4 The exclusive economic zone is the offshore zone where coastal states have jurisdiction over economic and resource management, including sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources, whether living or nonliving, of the seabed, subsoil, and the superjacent waters. Typically, the EEZ includes waters three to two hundred nautical miles offshore. See National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, “What is the EEZ?” http:// agreement between Norway and Russia over how best to divide a sector they both claimed in the Barents Sea, together with a commitment by the Arctic Five in 2008 to abide by procedures set forth in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for determining the dimensions of each country’s ECS, suggests that a peaceful settlement of any territorial dispute is more likely than not. Third, and finally, the sheer expense and technical challenges involved in extracting oil, gas, and other strategic resources from the Arctic ocean floor argue for a joint, collaborative effort among interested parties, Arctic and non-Arctic alike, as opposed to a “go it alone,” unilateralist approach. These and similar considerations are likely to preserve the Arctic as a “High North, low tension” arena, to borrow a phrase popularized by Norway’s foreign minister, for some years to come. This is not to suggest, however, that the Arctic promises to remain trouble-free as its resources and sea lanes become increasingly accessible. For one thing, it remains unclear what would happen if an Artic Five country whose ECS claim was rejected under UNCLOS procedures refused to abide by the ruling. Given the resource wealth that could be at stake, the resulting standoff could indeed lead to disputes and military posturing by rival claimants that could trigger, in turn, a crisis in the Arctic that might even end up with shots being fired. As for seaborne trade through the Arctic, smugglers and others involved in illicit commerce (possibly including terrorist elements) could eventually seek to take advantage – just as legitimate shippers would – of the shorter routes and transit times offered by Arctic sea lanes, benefits that may seem especially attractive in those areas (likely to be extensive in the wide-open, sparsely populated expanses of the High North) where transit routes are poorly policed. In addition, as its scale and importance grow, transarctic maritime traffic may be viewed as an attractive target for attack by various disaffected groups, especially when ships pass through narrow choke points such as the Bering Strait along the way. Such scenarios may seem far-fetched at the moment, but they cannot be dismissed in the event that a bustling trade in strategic commodities takes hold in the Arctic. This would be especially true were the Arctic to become the locus of a global trade in oil and gas, given all the vulnerabilities associated with offshore production facilities and the supporting infrastructure required to bring supplies to market, as well as the economic costs that could be imposed if important energy flows were disrupted. At the same time, whatever the level of regional tension at any particular time, the Arctic, situated atop three continents, has been and will continue to be, in geostrategic terms, an extremely valuable piece of real estate. Since the late 1950s, for example, the United States has viewed the Arctic Ocean as an ideal location for ballistic missile submarine patrols, and its importance for the strategic mobility of American naval forces, including surface as well as subsurface platforms, will almost certainly grow as Arctic waterways expand and become more navigable. In a similar vein, modern airlift and fighter/bomber aircraft based in Alaska are closer to Japan, South Korea, and China than they would be if they operated from the west coast of the United States, and no more than eight hours’ flight time from anywhere in the Northern Hemisphere, all of which significantly enhances America’s crisis response and power projection capabilities. Moreover, given that the Arctic would be an optimal vector for ballistic missile attacks against the United States originating from Russia, China, North Korea, or even Iran, it is also an ideal location for missile defense and early warning systems designed to handle current and emerging threats, perhaps to include someday – in view of the Arctic’s largely maritime character – sea-based platforms, such as the U.S. Navy’s Aegis-equipped cruisers. The ways in which these and other strategic advantages associated with the Arctic have influenced (and continue to influence) the national security perspectives of the United States, the other Arctic Five countries, and rising global powers (such as China) are discussed in detail in later chapters of this report, but the key point to be made here is that such advantages are real and growing, and that this will remain the case, whether or not the Arctic’s oil and gas deposits are effectively tapped, or its utility as a passageway for seaborne trade is fully exploited. Finally, developments in the Arctic may hold useful lessons for other resource-rich regions where territorial claims remain unsettled and freedom of the seas could be challenged. More specifically, if the Arctic states and other key stakeholders are able to develop a framework for regional collaboration that also respects and protects the national interests of the Arctic Five, a similar approach may also be tried (and eventually prove successful) in, for example, disputed maritime zones like the South China Sea. The geopolitical dynamics of the Arctic and South China Sea regions, of course, are not entirely similar, but there is enough overlap with regard to such issues as ensuring unimpeded maritime passage through international waters, agreeing on procedures for defining the ECS’s of neighboring states, and developing cooperative plans for drilling offshore oil and gas deposits, to warrant some degree of investigation into how well Arctic models of cooperation might apply, and the same may be true with regard to other areas of the globe of rising strategic importance where multiple national, regional, and international interests intersect. While the jury is still out on the best system of governance for the Arctic region as a whole, current trends suggest that a patchwork of relevant private, public, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations, rather than one overarching structure, is the best approach, centered perhaps around a core group of interested parties, which, in the case of the Arctic, would be the Arctic Council.5 As this approach matures, moreover, the Arctic could serve as a valuable laboratory for testing how best to establish and maintain a safe, stable, and secure environment in regions where a diversity of interests, ambitions, and expectations could easily clash, possibly in a violent manner, absent an effective mechanism for multinational and multilateral governance. With these observations in mind, the analysis that follows aims to paint a comprehensive picture of the new strategic map just now emerging in the Arctic, to examine what that portends with regard to the potential for conflict or cooperation within the region, and, on that basis, to determine as clearly as possible the likely policies and priorities of the Arctic Five and other key regional stakeholders, and the skills and capabilities to operate in the Arctic that they will require as a result. Chapter 2 sets the overall stage insofar as major region-wide dynamics are concerned, focusing in particular on the emergence of more navigable Arctic sea lanes, the scale and accessibility of the 5 Formally established in 1996, the Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum whose aim is to promote cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states (which includes the Arctic Five plus Iceland, Sweden, and Finland), with involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other key stakeholders that may be granted permanent observer status. Traditionally, the council has focused on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic, but, as the Arctic becomes more accessible, the council has branched out to address search and rescue, oil spill response at sea, and other civil emergency requirements. Now that the council has set up a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway (following the 2011 ministerial in Nuuk, Greenland), it is poised to play a more catalytic role in future debates over how best to manage the Arctic region. See the Arctic Council website, http://www. arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us. Arctic’s strategic resources, and ongoing challenges with regard to Arctic governance. Chapter 3 explores in depth the strategic interests of the Arctic Five countries and the steps they are taking to safeguard those interests, while chapter 4 analyzes the priorities and programs of the other national and institutional stakeholders in the future of the Arctic, including the non-coastal Arctic states (Iceland, Sweden, and Finland) and the major Asian powers noted above (China, Japan, and South Korea), as well as NATO and the EU. Finally, chapter 5 offers some summary conclusions and policy recommendations, with an emphasis on what the United States needs to do to assert its leadership as this “new Arctic” described at the outset continues to take shape.

**No war- rationality and cooperation**

**Hart et al. ’12** Andrew Hart, doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado, Bruce Jones, Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order Initiative at Brookings and NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, and David Steven, Senior Fellow at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation and leads MGO’s Geopolitics of Scarcity Project, “Chill Out: Why Cooperation is Balancing Conflict Among Major Powers in the New Arctic,” Brookings, May 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/5/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jones/30%20arctic%20cooperation%20jones.pdf>

Over the coming decades, risk in the Arctic will continue to intensify, although there could be a pause if the region experiences a run of cold summers, if resources prove hard to extract at a reasonable cost, or if global economic malaise drives down the oil price to a level where the Arctic’s resources have no hope of being competitive. Recent years, however, have already heightened states’ sensitivity to the challenges a changing Arctic poses. Sufficient momentum has been created that the impetus to explore routes for cooperation, or to unleash unilateral and coercive responses when cooperation fails, is likely to remain strong in the short to medium term. So far, the Arctic has defied the predictions of pessimists who expected the region to become a focus for unchecked commercial and strategic competition. Given this success, can it offer some lessons for deconfliction, the management of tensions, and perhaps even cooperation in other regions where energy or resource competition has the potential to create geopolitical friction? Hardest will inevitably be the South China Seas. At one level, that terrain has a similar mix of uncharted energy resources, ill-defined boundaries, and great power security tensions. In the Arctic, the Ilulissat Agreement has set a precedent for states to apply the provisions of the Law of the Sea, despite the U.S. not ratifying that agreement. Such an approach will not easily be followed in the South China Seas, given the intensity of boundary disputes and long running tensions over Taiwan. However, some of the second-order mechanisms that have emerged in the Arctic could provide lessons towards the reduction of conflict and crisis containment in that more volatile region. In the Arctic, states are recognizing the need for new types of cooperation to address fast-changing challenges. The United States and Russia are, of course, playing a central role, but middle powers have demonstrated their potential as conveners and pioneers of new approaches. Perhaps most importantly, the assumption of inevitable conflict in the region has been successfully challenged. In an unstable world, and one where many global arrangements are straining to adapt to changing power dynamics, we could do worse than learn lessons from what the Arctic states are trying to achieve.

**Sub dominance US would quickly win an Arctic war- no escalation**

**Axe ‘11** [David, Military correspondent and contributor or editor to the Washington Times, C-SPAN, Wired, World Politics Review, and more, “How the U.S. Wins the Coming Arctic War”, Wired, 1/11/11, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/01/how-the-u-s-wins-the-coming-arctic-war/]

But these tales, my versions included, usually omit two vital points: that Arctic conflict is unlikely to occur at all; and even if it does, the U.S. will have an overwhelming advantage over any rival. **The Washington Post** was the latest to repeat the Arctic-war theme, in a story published yesterday. “The Arctic is believed to hold nearly a quarter of the world’s untapped natural resources and a new passage could shave as much as 40 percent of the time it takes for commercial shippers to travel from the Atlantic to the Pacific,” Jacquelyn Ryan wrote. But, she added, “government and military officials are concerned the United States is not moving quickly enough to protect American interests in this vulnerable and fast-changing region.” Specifically, the U.S. does not have enough icebreakers or permanent bases on the Alaskan north slope. Canada andRussia, by contrast, are buying ice-hardened Arctic ships and building new facilities to enforce their Arctic claims, Ryan pointed out. The thing is, it’s not icebreakers and patches of wind-blasted tarmac that would really matter in some future North Pole showdown. In the Arctic, as in any sea battle, American nuclear attack submarines — quiet, versatile and lethal — would make all the difference. U.S. subs have been sneaking around under the Arctic ice, and occasionally surfacing, for decades. Today, they even carry geologists and other scientists in order to help map Arctic mineral deposits. “In addition to being more heavily armed than most foreign boats, U.S. submarines generally have superior quieting and combat systems, better-trained crewmen, and much more rigorous maintenance standards,” Bob Work wrote in 2008, before becoming Navy undersecretary. “As a result, the U.S. submarine force has generally been confident that it could defeat any potential undersea opponent, even if significantly outnumbered.” But in the Arctic, facing only the Canadians, Russians, Danes and Norwegians — none of whom have large or healthy sub fleets — the U.S. Navy’s 50 **Los Angeles**-, **Seawolf**- and **Virginia**-class subs would be more numerous as well as more powerful. And besides, an Arctic war is highly unlikely, at best. “Militarized conflict over the Arctic is unlikely, and regional disputes are unlikely to cause an overall deterioration in relations between or among polar nations,” the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded in a 2009 conference. “Security issues should not be sensationalized in order to attract attention towards the Arctic.” But it’s rare anyone writes stories about how we’ve got enough weapons — and don’t really need them, besides. After all, it’s the sensational stories about shortages and looming disaster that sell newspapers.

**No impact to CBWs**

**Easterbrook ‘3** (Gregg Easterbrook, senior fellow at The New Republic, July 2003, Wired, “We’re All Gonna Die!” http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=2&topic=&topic\_set=

3. Germ warfare!Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn’t kill off humanity. **Most people** who were caught in the epidemic **survived. Any superbug introduced into today’s Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents**. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But **no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.**

**This is a joke- more oil rigs in a harsh environment obviously doesn’t help ecosystems**

**Multiple alt causes to Arctic biodiversity loss**

**Johnsen et al ’10** [K.I. Johnsen, B. Alfthan, L. Hislop, J.F. Skaalvik, editorial team for the United Nations Environment Programme, “Protecting Arctic Biodiversity,” online]

**The biggest environmental challenges that affect Arctic biodiversity, ecosystem services, and economically important biological resources include climate change, industrial and associated infrastructure development both on land and at sea, resource depletion** (e.g., fisheries and forestry), **pollution, and increased human activity** (e.g., shipping, tourism, military activities, overharvesting). **Climate change is emerging as the most significant stressor on Arctic biodiversity**7. There are many uncertainties surrounding the rate and direction of climate change and the impact this will have on Arctic biodiversity. **The consequences of global warming are likely to increase the pressure on biodiversity from other sources like contamination** (e.g. the secondary release of POPs from melting snow, ice and permafrost), **invasive species, and the development and extraction of oil and gas and other resources** (see Part II for examples). **The increased stress could threaten the resilience and sustainability of the Arctic’s biodiversity and the overall balance of its ecosystems, and thereby the Arctic ecosystem services and Arctic peoples’ livelihoods**.

**US drilling isn’t better for the environment- no reforms**

**Beinecke ’11** [Frances Beinecke is the president of the Natural Resources Defense Council, “America Is Not Prepared to Safely Drill in ANWR,” Nov. 3, <http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-it-time-to-drill-in-the-arctic-refuge/america-is-not-prepared-to-safely-drill-in-anwr>]

**It took five months to kill BP's ruptured oil well in the Gulf of Mexico**. Even though it occurred in a well charted body of water next to a heavily populated coastline, even though **it was in a warm climate, and even though it was close to thousands of available cleanup vessels. The Arctic region has none of those features. It is dominated by extreme cold, dense fog, and long periods of darkness. Much of the year it is covered by ice. All of these challenges are compounded by remoteness. The closest Coast Guard base is 1,000 miles away. Two of the Coast Guards polar icebreaking vessels are not even operational**, leaving only one. **Bringing rescue crews and cleanup equipment to the Arctic would be a staggering challenge. Meanwhile, a spill would exact its toll on a one-of-a-kind landscape. The Arctic Wildlife National Refuge is one of the last wild places on Earth. It is a birthing ground for caribou, polar bears, grizzly bears, arctic fox, and many other species. It is also the densest on-shore polar bear denning area in the U.S**. Even if a spill occurred offshore, the shore and barrier islands of the refuge would likely be oiled, threatening much of the food web, including marine mammals such as ice seals, which polar bears rely on for food. The ripple effect would reach the onshore wildlife in no time. **Following the BP disaster, oil executives admitted the industry lacked a rigorous safety culture in the offshore environment. Federal officials testified they didn't have the money, staff, or expertise to oversee it. Little has changed since then. Congress hasn't passed a single bill to strengthen drilling safeguards**.

**Unilateral efforts can’t solve Arctic leadership**

**Smith ’11** [Colonel Reginald R. Smith, USAF, is Professor of National Security Affairs and Senior Developmental Education Student (Strategy and Policy) at the Naval War College, “The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm or the Next "Cold War"?” <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf>]

**The United States must move outside the construct of unilateral action in order to preserve its sovereign rights in the Arctic**, capitalize on the opportunities available, and safeguard vital national interests in the region. **In today's budget-constrained environment and as a Nation at war with higher resource priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan than in the Arctic, it is unrealistic to believe that any significant allocation will be programmed for addressing this issue**.3 **Since the United States is too far behind in actions necessary to preserve its critical interests as compared to the other Arctic countries, the Nation must take the lead to cultivate a new multilateral partnership paradigm in the region**.

### Helium

**Great power war is a myth – nuclear deterrence and liberal democracies ensure NO conflict is likely to erupt -**

**Ikenberry 11** (G. John, “A World of our Making” [**http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all**](http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all))

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system.

**Newest data proves - no risk of nuclear terror**

**Mueller 11**—IR prof at Ohio State. PhD in pol sci from UCLA (2 August 2011, John, The Truth about Al Qaeda, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68012/john-mueller/the-truth-about-al-qaeda?page=show)

As a misguided Turkish proverb holds, "If your enemy be an ant, imagine him to be an elephant." The new information unearthed in Osama bin Laden's hideout in Abbottabad, Pakistan, suggests that the United States has been doing so for a full decade. Whatever al Qaeda's threatening rhetoric and occasional nuclear fantasies, its potential as a menace, particularly as an atomic one, has been much inflated. The public has now endured a decade of dire warnings about the imminence of a terrorist atomic attack. In 2004, the former CIA spook Michael Scheuer proclaimed on television's 60 Minutes that it was "probably a near thing," and in 2007, the physicist Richard Garwin assessed the likelihood of a nuclear explosion in an American or a European city by terrorism or other means in the next ten years to be 87 percent. By 2008, Defense Secretary Robert Gates mused that what keeps every senior government leader awake at night is "the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear." Few, it seems, found much solace in the fact that an al Qaeda computer seized in Afghanistan in 2001 indicated that the group's budget for research on weapons of mass destruction (almost all of it focused on primitive chemical weapons work) was some $2,000 to $4,000. In the wake of the killing of Osama bin Laden, officials now have more al Qaeda computers, which reportedly contain a wealth of information about the workings of the organization in the intervening decade. A multi-agency task force has completed its assessment, and according to first reports, it has found that al Qaeda members have primarily been engaged in dodging drone strikes and complaining about how cash-strapped they are. Some reports suggest they've also been looking at quite a bit of pornography. The full story is not out yet, but it seems breathtakingly unlikely that the miserable little group has had the time or inclination, let alone the money, to set up and staff a uranium-seizing operation, as well as a fancy, super-high-tech facility to fabricate a bomb. It is a process that requires trusting corrupted foreign collaborators and other criminals, obtaining and transporting highly guarded material, setting up a machine shop staffed with top scientists and technicians, and rolling the heavy, cumbersome, and untested finished product into position to be detonated by a skilled crew, all the while attracting no attention from outsiders. The documents also reveal that after fleeing Afghanistan, bin Laden maintained what one member of the task force calls an "obsession" with attacking the United States again, even though 9/11 was in many ways a disaster for the group. It led to a worldwide loss of support, a major attack on it and on its Taliban hosts, and a decade of furious and dedicated harassment. And indeed, bin Laden did repeatedly and publicly threaten an attack on the United States. He assured Americans in 2002 that "the youth of Islam are preparing things that will fill your hearts with fear"; and in 2006, he declared that his group had been able "to breach your security measures" and that "operations are under preparation, and you will see them on your own ground once they are finished." Al Qaeda's animated spokesman, Adam Gadahn, proclaimed in 2004 that "the streets of America shall run red with blood" and that "the next wave of attacks may come at any moment." The obsessive desire notwithstanding, such fulminations have clearly lacked substance. Although hundreds of millions of people enter the United States legally every year, and countless others illegally, no true al Qaeda cell has been found in the country since 9/11 and exceedingly few people have been uncovered who even have any sort of "link" to the organization. The closest effort at an al Qaeda operation within the country was a decidedly nonnuclear one by an Afghan-American, Najibullah Zazi, in 2009. Outraged at the U.S.-led war on his home country, Zazi attempted to join the Taliban but was persuaded by al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan to set off some bombs in the United States instead. Under surveillance from the start, he was soon arrested, and, however "radicalized," he has been talking to investigators ever since, turning traitor to his former colleagues. Whatever training Zazi received was inadequate; he repeatedly and desperately sought further instruction from his overseas instructors by phone. At one point, he purchased bomb material with a stolen credit card, guaranteeing that the purchase would attract attention and that security video recordings would be scrutinized. Apparently, his handlers were so strapped that they could not even advance him a bit of cash to purchase some hydrogen peroxide for making a bomb. For al Qaeda, then, the operation was a failure in every way -- except for the ego boost it got by inspiring the usual dire litany about the group's supposedly existential challenge to the United States, to the civilized world, to the modern state system. Indeed, no Muslim extremist has succeeded in detonating even a simple bomb in the United States in the last ten years, and except for the attacks on the London Underground in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. It seems wildly unlikely that al Qaeda is remotely ready to go nuclear. Outside of war zones, the amount of killing carried out by al Qaeda and al Qaeda linkees, maybes, and wannabes throughout the entire world since 9/11 stands at perhaps a few hundred per year. That's a few hundred too many, of course, but it scarcely presents an existential, or elephantine, threat. And the likelihood that an American will be killed by a terrorist of any ilk stands at one in 3.5 million per year, even with 9/11 included.

**No Retaliation.**

**Jenks-Smith and Herron 5** (Hank and Kerry, professor and adjunct professor at George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. “United States Public Response to Terrorism: Fault Lines or Bedrock?” Review of Policy Research. September. Lexis)

Our final contrasting set of expectations relates to the degree to which the public will support or demand retribution against terrorists and supporting states. Here our data show that **support for using conventional U**nited **S**tates **military force to retaliate against terrorists** initially averaged above midscale, but **did not reach a high level of demand for military action**. Initial support declined significantly across all demographic and belief categories by the time of our survey in 2002. Furthermore, **panelists** both in 2001 and 2002 **preferred that high levels of certainty about culpability** (above 8.5 on a scale from zero to ten) **be established before taking military action**. Again, we find the weight of evidence supporting revisionist expectations of public opinion. Overall, **these results are inconsistent with the contention that highly charged events will result in volatile and unstructured responses among mass publics** that prove problematic for policy processes. The initial response to the terrorist strikes demonstrated a broad and consistent shift in public assessments toward a greater perceived threat from terrorism, and greater willingness to support policies to reduce that threat. But **even in the highly charged context of** such **a serious attack on the American homeland**, the overall public response was quite measured. On average, **the public showed very little propensity to** undermine speech protections, and initial willingness to **engage in military retaliation** moderated significantly over the following year.

**Alt causes to aerospace decline (lack of investment, outsourcing, economic downturn, and infrastructure)**

**Walker 2** (Robert, Chair – Commission on the Fuure of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, “Final Report”, November,

http://www.trade.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/AeroCommissionFinalReport.pdf)

The **U.S. aerospace** sector, most notably the commercial air sector, **is seen** increasingly **as a mature industry lacking in capital investment, innovation, and capacity for growth**. Aerospace sector market capitalization, research and development investments and return on investments/assets are down and consolidations are up. **The U.S. is losing global market share** and its positive balance of trade in aerospace manufacturing is eroding. **Jobs are going overseas.** The **U.S. economic downturn**, coupled with the additional security costs resulting from the September 11 terrorist attacks, **is crippling the airlines** and causing massive layoffs. Meanwhile, today’s air transportation system—based on 1960s technology and operational concepts—is reaching capacity, resulting in increasing delays and costs for both passengers and shippers. At the same time, **government investments in longterm civil aerospace research are static**, if not declining in real terms. The lack of sustained, long-term investment is **stifling innovation** and preventing the establishment of new economic growth curves for air transportation and space. While the military has recently received significant increases, both in research and development and in procurement accounts, those increases focus on near-term counter-terrorism and homeland security problems and may be short-lived. **The aerospace workforce and infrastructure are aging, and there is a lack of compelling vision or robust financial outlook** to draw our youth into this important business sector.

**Antimatter is safe – Their impacts assume creating huge quantities which take 2 billion years. Plus, CERN protocols check.**

**European Organization for Nuclear Research 08** January, “Angels and Demons” http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/Spotlight/SpotlightAandD-en.html

**How safe is antimatter? Perfectly safe, given the minute quantities we can make. It would be very dangerous if we could make a few grams of it, but this would take us billions of years. If so, does CERN have protocols to keep the public safe**? There is no danger from antimatter. There are of course other dangers on the CERN site, as in any laboratory: high voltage in certain areas, deep pits to fall in, etc. but for these dangers the usual **industrial safety measures are in place. There is no danger of radioactive leaks a**s you might find near nuclear power stations. Does one gram of antimatter contain the energy of a 20 kilotonne nuclear bomb? Twenty kilotonnes of TNT is the equivalent of the atom bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. The explosion of a kilotonne (=1000 tonnes) of TNT corresponds to a energy release of 4.2x1012 joules (1012 is a 1 followed by 12 zeros, i.e. a million million). For comparison, a 60 watt light bulb consumes 60 J per second. You are probably asking for the explosive release of energy by the sudden annihilation of one gram of antimatter with one gram of matter. Let's calculate it. To calculate the energy released in the annihilation of 1 g of antimatter with 1 g of matter (which makes 2 g = 0.002 kg), we have to use the formula E=mc2, where c is the speed of light (300,000,000 m/s): E= 0.002 x (300,000,000)2 kg m2/s2 = 1.8 x 1014 J = 180 x 1012 J. Since 4.2x1012 J corresponds to a kilotonne of TNT, then 2 g of matter-antimatter annihilation correspond to 180/4.2 = 42.8 kilotonnes, about double the 20 kt of TNT. This means that **you ‘only’ need half a gram of antimatter to be equally destructive as the Hiroshima bomb, since the other half gram of (normal) matter is easy enough to find. At CERN we make quantities of the order of 107 antiprotons per second** and there are 6x1023 of them in a single gram of antihydrogen. You can easily calculate how long it would take to get one gram: we would need 6x1023/107=6x1016 seconds. There are only 365 (days) x 24 (h) x 60 (min) x 60 (sec) = around 3x107 seconds in a year, so **it would take roughly 6x1016 / 3x107 = 2x109 = two billion years!** It is quite unlikely that anyone wants to wait that long.

**No one will retrieve helium- flawed pricing and the Federal Reserve has no money**

**Plumer ’12** [Brad, reporter at the Washington Post writing about domestic policy, particularly energy and environmental issues, “Congress turns its attention to... America’s helium crisis,” 5-13-12, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/congress-turns-its-attention-to-americas-helium-crisis/2012/05/12/gIQA4fIbKU\_blog.html]

There was just one small hitch. According to a 2010 report by the National Research Council, the formula that Congress used to set the price for the helium was flawed. Bingaman has dubbed it a “fire sale.” The federally owned helium now sells for about half of what it would on the open market (see chart on the right).¶ And, since the Federal Helium Reserve provides about one-third of the world’s helium each year, this has upended the entire market. There’s little incentive to conserve, recycle or find new sources of helium. Instead, we’ve been frittering it away. And once helium escapes into the air, it can’t be recovered. That’s partly why, since 2011, the world has been running into shortages, as demand has outstripped supply.¶ Worse, under existing law, the Federal Helium Reserve could run out of money to operate as early as mid-2013. When that happens, it will still have a large chunk of the world’s helium supply locked in the reservoir — but no one will be able to access it.¶ “If Congress does not act,” Bingaman said, “the helium program will disappear altogether in less than three years, leaving our hospitals, national labs, domestic manufacturers and helium producers without an adequate supply.”

### Solvency

**Icebreakers are key to solve, which they don’t do- AFF author**

**Cohen and Altman 11** Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. is a Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy at the Heritage Foundation, Anton Altman is a research volunteer at The Heritage Foundation, August 16, 2011, “Russia’s Arctic Claims: Neither LOST nor Forgotten”, <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/08/16/russias-arctic-claims-neither-lost-nor-forgotten/>

Moscow has an unquestionable head start on the rest of the world, and it is not shy about investing in its ambitions. At least six new icebreakers and Sabetta, a new year-round port on the arctic shores—costing $33 billion—are on the agenda, but Prime Minister Putin has said the Kremlin is “open for a dialogue with our foreign partners and with all our neighbors in the Arctic region, but of course we will defend our own geopolitical interests firmly and consistently.” Or as they said in Soviet times, “What is mine is mine, and what is yours is negotiable.”¶ The Arctic is of vital geopolitical importance not just to Russia, but to the entire world. It has enormous quantities of hydrocarbon energy and other natural resources, and as the Arctic is no longer completely icebound, in summertime it may become an important transportation route vital to U.S. national security.¶ Despite this, at present the U.S. has made virtually no effort to strengthen its position in the frozen final frontier. The chief concern is America’s lack of icebreakers—even Canada and Finland have more than the United States. Icebreakers are vital to exploring the Arctic and enforcing one’s sovereignty there. As of 2010, Russia had 29 icebreakers in total and was building more. The United States had two (including one that is obsolete), with no plans to expand. The Heritage Foundation has exposed this problem extensively:¶ The United States has significant geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the High North, but the lack of policy attention and insufficient funding have placed the U.S. on track to abdicate its national interests in this critical region.¶ The United States must strengthen its position in the Arctic and make its interests clear to friend and foe alike. Washington should reach out to the Arctic Council members to block Russia’s expansion plans at the U.N. Meanwhile, the U.S. should fund and build its icebreaking squadron and deploy it in Alaska.¶ Russia’s Arctic aspirations are a serious geopolitical challenge for U.S. and allied interests. America’s security and economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on U.S. ability to access polar waters and the Arctic Ocean bed.

**The un-underlined part of their Bert evidence says that a comprehensive strategy is key to investment- ratifying LOST, new shipping regs and identification systems, Russian cooperation in the Bering Strait, etc- plan solve none of these**

**Drilling fails- several reasons companies won’t drill**

Recent Shell accidents

Poor equipment and infrastructure

Harsh weather conditions

Long timeframe

**Krauss and Broder 1-17**-13 [Clifford Krauss has been a correspondent for The New York Times since 1990. He currently is a national business correspondent based in Houston, covering energy. He covered the State Department, Congress and the New York City police department before serving as Buenos Aires bureau chief and Toronto bureau chief, John M. Broder, correspondent for The New York Times, “As Shell’s Arctic Drilling Hopes Hit Snags, Its Rivals Watch,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/business/energy-environment/rivals-watch-travails-of-shell-arctic-drilling.html?pagewanted=all&\_r=0]

Royal Dutch Shell’s Arctic drilling program is now officially in jeopardy and its prospects will depend on the findings of two continuing federal inquiries. One review is on the grounding of the Kulluk drill ship on New Year’s Eve after it was set adrift for five days in stormy weather, and the other is on the safety management of the entire Shell program. **Rival oil companies**, as they form their strategic choices, **are keenly watching** to see how Shell’s $4.5 billion exploratory operation off the North Slope of Alaska is faring and **how the effort is working** with wary United States regulators.¶ **The answer**, so far at least, **is not well**.¶ The grounding of the Kulluk was only the latest in an extensive series of Shell missteps that environmentalists say highlight the dangers inherent in prospecting for oil in the unpredictable and severe Arctic environment.¶ Ken Salazar, the interior secretary, has already expressed what he called a “troubling sense” about Shell’s repeated operational mistakes — the latest being violations of air quality permits by both of Shell’s drilling rigs in Arctic waters last summer.¶ This week, before announcing that he would step down March 1, Mr. Salazar reaffirmed the Obama administration’s commitment to continued Arctic oil exploration as part of the administration’s so-called all-of-the-above energy policy. But he pointedly left open the timetable for renewed drilling and was noncommittal about whether Shell would remain the primary company involved.¶ Shell has begun its own internal investigation of its Arctic program, one that company officials say could lead to major changes in its operations in Alaska. “It’s critical that we identify what went wrong and learn from it,” said Curtis Smith, a company spokesman. “Alaskans expect more from Shell and so do we.”¶ Meanwhile, energy specialists and outside advisers to Mr. Salazar said the administration review, to be completed by March, could result in an outright drilling moratorium similar to the one imposed after the 2010 BP spill in the Gulf of Mexico.¶ Surging domestic oil and gas production, they say, affords the administration time to go slowly in the Arctic given Shell’s rocky, accident-prone start. Although a pause in the action would be costly to Shell, it would give the company more time to correct the many early operational and regulatory errors.¶ “We shouldn’t be in a rush,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, executive director of energy and sustainability at University of California, Davis. “We have all these shale resources onshore. We are doing well again drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, so why hurry in Alaska? At the end of any review, they will have to ask themselves: Is this something that can be done safely given the unique challenges of the Alaskan Arctic?”¶ Senator Mark Begich, Democrat of Alaska, a strong advocate of Arctic oil and gas exploration, said that even a one-year delay would be a “disaster” that would set the drilling program back years.¶ “Because of the logistical requirements, this could easily be a three-year delay,” he said. “In the Gulf of Mexico, a year means a year. In the Arctic, a year would mean three.”¶ Shell and the federal government have much at stake. Shell’s six years of effort and investment could put it at the forefront of the next big global oil prospect.¶ For the Obama administration, the rough start to drilling in the Arctic has called into question the credibility of federal regulation of the oil industry as well as the potential for billions of dollars of royalty payments from Arctic oil and a reduced dependence on imported fuels.¶ This early phase of Arctic exploration was supposed to be the easy part — drilling low-pressure wells in shallow water during generally benign summer weather. But problems with equipment, transportation, persistent sea ice and poor management//////////// have caused many to question whether the infinitely more complex long-term goal of year-round production in the Arctic is even feasible.¶ Drilling platforms that will operate permanently throughout the year will require engineering robust enough to withstand the brute force of crashing icebergs. Pipelines will need to be designed and laid to connect offshore fields with the Trans-Alaska Pipeline; they will need to be buried deep below the seafloor to protect them from sea ice known to gouge into the seabed.¶ “These are very complex operations that require many elements to fall exactly in place,” said Tad Patzek, chairman of the Department of Petroleum and Geosystems Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin.¶ Halting Arctic drilling, even if temporarily, would please environmentalists, perhaps affording the Obama administration political space to approve the contentious Keystone XL pipeline connecting oil sand fields in Canada to refineries in the United States. The administration could decide on both projects in late March, presenting it with complex political calculations early in Mr. Obama’s second term.¶ Lois Epstein, an Alaska-based environmental engineer and a member of an Interior Department advisory panel on offshore drilling safety, said that the current reviews could result in a drilling timeout.¶ “They want the investigation to have credibility and not be a whitewash,” said Ms. Epstein, the Alaska program director for the Wilderness Society. “If the report includes substantial information suggesting that moving forward in the Arctic is a mistake, then the administration will have to take that information seriously.”¶ In the last seven months, Shell was forced to repeatedly ask for variances or exemptions from federal permit requirements. Its second drill ship, the Noble Discoverer, nearly ran aground after dragging its anchor last July, and four months later was damaged by an explosion and fire in its harbor — both incidents in waters well below the Arctic Circle.¶ Last August, an oil spill response barge failed Coast Guard inspections, and was fined for four illegal fluid discharges. When the containment device carried on the barge was tested, it came loose while being lowered into the water. The device, a dome, did not hit the seafloor but as it surfaced a valve failed and it released nitrogen gas that was stored inside to keep it buoyant. Under water pressure, the steel siding of the dome bent.¶ The absence of the containment equipment forced the company to put off drilling in deep underwater zones full of oil and gas.¶ Energy specialists are concerned that the Kulluk’s engines, while adrift, might have been flooded with seawater, leaving them so badly damaged that the vessel might not be ready in 2013, even if Shell were allowed to proceed.¶ They say the federal government counted on Shell, a pioneer in deep offshore drilling with experience operating in the Russian Arctic, to blaze the trail in Alaska.¶ So far, the **reaction from its competitors has been to steer clear**.

**No Arctic infrastructure for the plan- multiple reasons**

**DoD ‘11** [US Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Arctic Operations and the Northwest Passage” May 2011; < <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Tab_A_Arctic_Report_Public.pdf>]

Construction in the Arctic is seasonal and skilled labor is usually in short supply; therefore, costs for both construction and maintenance are high. The need to provide room and board at remote locations, decreased efficiency of workers and machinery in extreme environmental conditions, and the difficulties, costs, and risks in shipping materials and equipment add to the challenge. Because of the short construction season, outside work must be accomplished quickly, dictating a high degree of expensive prefabricated construction. During ice-free periods, the most economical means of transportation is by barge. During the winter, transportation over frozen rivers and lakes may be more economical than air transportation. But delays in shipping equipment due to weather can result in prolonged construction times and expensive emergency air freight costs. Construction in the Arctic costs, as a rule of thumb, three to five times more than comparable infrastructure in lower latitudes. Another challenge to bear in mind is the risk to existing infrastructure posed by thawing permafrost. As the permafrost thaws, it loses strength and volume, leading to failure of foundations and piling. The warming climate will also accelerate the erosion of shorelines and riverbanks, threatening infrastructure located on eroding shorelines.

# 2NC

## CP

### 2NC AT: Perm

#### 1.

#### 2. Perm kills solvency –unilateral arctic interests destroys multilateralism AND multilateralism is the only way to prevent conflict

**Sotnikov ‘10** (Ivan, RIA Novosti correspondent interviewing Willy Ostreng who is a ***Professor and Chairman of the Research Institute Ocean Futures from Oslo, Norway, 4/23/10,*** http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20100423/158712741.html)

What kind of instruments can be used by each of the five countries for upholding their interests in the region?The short answer can be divided in three: 1. Through international cooperation and diplomacy in regional organs like the Arctic Council, the Euro-Arctic Barents Region, Northern Forum etc. 2. through bilateral cooperation to resolve outstanding questions between neighbours, in particular to reach agreement on delimitation issues, and to handle border crossing issue (fish stock management, rescue, environment etc.). 3. Strengthen the position of the International Maritime Organization to standardize rules for shipping in ice-infested waters and make them mandatory through international agreements  and conventions. In particular, I think there is a pressing need to strengthen the position of the Arctic Council by broadening its agenda to discuss and eventually resolve problems of a circumpolar character and challenges of a cross border nature shared by all littoral states. Since sub-regions of the Arctic may contain special challenges between two or more countries, sub-regional organs like the Barents-Euro Arctic Region may serve a similar role as that of the Arctic Council, but on a sub-regional level.

### 2NC Solvency arctic

#### Arctic councils solve Arctic conflict

**Regeringskansliet,** 2/15/**12** (Government offices of Sweden, http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/15777/a/186366)

"In many ways we are facing tremendous challenges in the Arctic. Despite the challenges, cooperation between the Arctic states remains pragmatic and low-key and produces solid results. This is a great success in a world where not all multilateral organisations are working as well as we would hope," said Mr Bildt. Mr Bildt sees several reasons why the cooperation works so well. One factor that he mentions is the involvement of the Permanent Participants (representatives of six Arctic indigenous peoples' organisations) in all levels of the Council's work, which ensures that the people of the region have a voice and influence. The efficient and close cooperation between experts and political decision-makers is another contributory factor highlighted by Mr Bildt. The Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (CPAR) is a parliamentary body consisting of members of the national parliaments of the Arctic states. The Conference meets every other year, with the latest meeting being held at the European Parliament in Brussels in 2010. SCPAR is responsible for work between the Conference meetings. The Committee, which meets three or four times a year to discuss current issues in the Arctic, seeks to promote the activities of the Arctic Council. Sweden assumed the Chairmanship of the Arctic Council on 12 May 2011. During the meeting, Mr Bildt gave a status report on the Swedish Chairmanship. "During the Swedish Chairmanship we want to continue strengthening Arctic cooperation so as to be able to address the increased activities in the region. We want to build on earlier success but also develop the Arctic Council in new ways," said Mr Bildt. Mr Bildt also mentioned some of the priorities the Council is working on. One of them is a project on sustainable entrepreneurship in the Arctic. Another is to improve the communication of results by the Arctic Council, by developing a communication strategy for the Council and by launching the new website. Other points on the agenda of the meeting included oil and gas development in the Arctic region and the impact of climate change on human health.

#### Arctic Council solves; US key

**Perry and Andersen 12** (<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf>, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration, February 2012, Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen. Dr. Perry is vice president and director of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., and vice president of National Security Planning Associates, Inc. Dr. Perry also directs and/or contributes to a number of Institute studies that focus on specific aspects of U.S. defense reform and military transformation to meet post-9/11 security challenges. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Bobby Anderson is a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. She focuses on Nordic affairs, NATO and European security issues, U.S. defense strategy, regional security developments in the Asia-Pacific, changing security dynamics in the Arctic region.)

The Arctic Council In the very near term however, the Arctic Council, the region’s principal high-level forum for the promotion of cooperation and interaction among the eight Arctic states, a number of permanent observers, and a variety of affiliated organizations (for specific issues), looms as perhaps the central structure around which a broader regional governance system for the High North might be built, even though its decisions and policies on matters of substance continue for the most part to lack intrinsic legal quality. Established in 1996 as an extension of the earlier Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic Council provides a valuable intergovernmental mechanism for addressing a number of “soft law,” or non-binding, issues, including environmental protection and sustainable development, and for monitoring and assessing new 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region | Emerging Strategic Dynamics 25 developments in the Arctic, although its scope explicitly excludes “matters related to military security.”102 As a result, the Arctic Council’s formal competence, resources, and instruments are not designed or equipped to deal with the “hard,” security-related strategic dimension of Arctic challenges, or with the “the real dynamics of commercial exploitation and economic development” in the polar region, shortfalls that have undermined the organization’s ability to address key governance issues in a holistic manner.103 It is, therefore, primarily a policy-shaping body that functions as a consensus-based, facilitating, or catalytic forum, rather than a regulatory or decision-making entity.104 Moreover, the council’s informal practice of avoiding fisheries issues, its lack of reliable funding sources, and its current exclusion of major non-Arctic states that are likely to have at least some say in future events in the region, have led a number of experts to characterize it as a “high-minded” and “toothless” arrangement, typically seen as the protector of smaller players, such as indigenous peoples, and often limited in its initiatives to those supported on a voluntary basis by one or more of its members.105 Nevertheless, the Arctic Council has succeeded in its work well beyond initial expectations. Though not a governance system in its own right, it has achieved remarkable results in identifying emerging Arctic issues that need 102 By extension, the concept of “peace” (and “security”) as a goal was also eschewed. Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council, Ottawa, Canada, September 19, 1996, http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/ottawa\_ decl\_1996-3.pdf. 103 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North.” 104 Timo Koivurova and David Vangerzwaag, “The Arctic Council at 10 Years: Retrospect and Prospects,” University of British Columbia Law Review, no. 121, May 2007. 105 Bailes, “Options for Closer Cooperation in the High North.” to be addressed, moving them onto the policy agendas of Arctic stakeholders, supplying invaluable background analyses for relevant questions, and providing a venue in which a host of regional non-state actors can participate more effectively in Arctic policy development.106 A notable high point came at the May 2011 Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, with the signing of the historic search and rescue agreement discussed above, the first-ever legally binding treaty to emerge out of the Arctic Council process, as well as the first binding agreement endorsed by all eight Arctic states on any issue. Significantly, at this same meeting, council members also agreed to establish a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, as a way to improve institutional continuity and efficiency of administration, and they launched a new initiative to examine further the concept of ecosystembased management, or the notion of looking at the full range of human activities taking place within a given ecosystem (in this case, the Arctic) with a view to managing those developments in a sustainable manner. In two other important steps, the council mandated the establishment of a new task force, charged with overseeing the development of appropriate prevention and response measures to deal with the real possibility of a major oil spill incident in polar waters, and it agreed as well to define more clearly the criteria for determining which countries and organizations should be given permanent observer status on the council. According to a number of longstanding observers of Arctic trends, this increasing institutionalization of the Arctic Council may pave the way toward a more inclusive and effective governance structure for the Arctic region, setting in place a system by which interested parties – be they state or non-state – can join with Arctic states in an “Arctic Council Plus” format to tackle specific policy challenges. In this way, the council could help to promote joint research and multilateral cooperation on //fairly non-controversial (but still quite important) projects of common interest, such as the commercial development of methane hydrates extracted from Arctic waters, disaster relief preparedness in the Arctic region, and new tanker designs for transporting oil and gas in the High North environment. By taking additional steps to improve communi- cation and information sharing among its members and affiliates (policy objectives identified by Sweden as priorities under its current council chairmanship107), the council can become the primary repository for knowledge on Arctic affairs and play an even greater role than it already does “in amplifying the voice of the Arctic in global settings.”108 Taken together, these initiatives could also serve as important confidence-building measures (or CBMs) that could help to dampen the potential for rivalry and boost the prospects for multinational and/or cross-organizational cooperation among Arctic stakeholders – at least with respect to soft security matters – should the “great Arctic gold rush” heat up in earnest. It will take, however, a major change in policy and a serious act of leadership by the United States to drive the Arctic Council in this direction, as it was Washington that prevented the group at its creation from tackling security-related issues. Secretary of State Clinton’s participation in the recent Nuuk ministerial meeting, the highest level of attendance by a U.S. official at any Arctic Council gathering, together with America’s co-chairmanship (with Russia) of the council task force that developed the SAR treaty, and its leadership role in the new oil-spill task force, may just be the first necessary steps in this direction.

### 2NC – Solvency helium

#### Emptying the reserve solves-

Bruno 12 (Paul, “Helium Conservation Legislation: Will Helium Policy be Strengthened in 2013”) http://maritime.about.com/od/shipbuilding/a/Helium-Conservation-Legislation.htm

Ongoing mismanagement of the global helium supply continues to threaten many industries essential to national defense. Shipbuilding is strongly impacted by this mismanagement because aluminum based alloys are seeing increased use in military and domestic high efficiency designs. The [helium shortages](http://maritime.about.com/od/shipbuilding/a/Helium-Shortages-Are-Coming.htm) are compounded by two factors; the great majority of the essential gas is held in reserves in the south central plains of the U.S., and that reserve is managed by the U.S. Congress which is particularly dysfunctional at this time. The main reason helium is in short supply is its finite nature. There will never be helium in the amount that are available today. It is the second most abundant element in the universe but we mine it from natural gas deposits in the ground where it is created by radioactive decay over millions of years. If the gas is used for shielding during a weld that gas escapes into outer space soon after release.

### A2 – sci dip

**No impact to science diplomacy**

**Dickson 9** [David, Direction Science & Development Network. June 2, 2009, “Science diplomacy: the case for caution”, [http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/new- frontiers-in-science-diplomacy-2009](http://scidevnet.wordpress.com/category/new-%20frontiers-in-science-diplomacy-2009), SM]

One of the frustrations of meetings at which scientists gather to discuss policy-related issues is the speed with which **the requirements for evidence-based discussion they would expect in a professional context can go out of the window.** Such has been the issue over the past two days in the meeting jointly organised in London by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and the Royal Society on the topic “New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy“. There has been much lively discussion on the value of international collaboration in achieving scientific goals, on the need for researchers to work together on the scientific aspects of global challenges such as climate change and food security, and on the importance of science capacity building in developing countries in order to make this possible. But there remained little evidence at the end of the meeting on how useful it was to lump all these activities together under the umbrella term of “science diplomacy”. More significantly, although numerous claims were made during the conference about the broader social and political value of scientific collaboration – for example, in establishing a framework for collaboration in other areas, and in particular reducing tensions between rival countries – **little was produced to demonstrate whether this hypothesis is true.** If it is not, then **some of the arguments made on behalf of “science diplomacy”, and in particular its value as a mechanism for exercising “soft power” in foreign policy, do not stand up to close scrutiny**. Indeed, a case can be made that where scientific projects have successfully involved substantial international collaboration, such success is often **heavily dependent on a prior political commitment to cooperation, rather than a mechanism for securing cooperation where the political will is lacking**. Three messages appeared to emerge from the two days of discussion. Firstly, where the political will to collaborate does exist, a joint scientific project can be a useful expression of that will. Furthermore, it can be an enlightening experience for all those directly involved. But it is **seldom a magic wand that can secure broader cooperation** where none existed before. Secondly, “science diplomacy” will only become recognised as a useful activity if it is closely defined to cover specific situations (such as the negotiation of major international scientific projects or collaborative research enterprises). As an umbrella term embracing the many ways in which science interacts with foreign policy, it loses much of its impact, and thus its value. Finally, when it comes to promoting the use of science in developing countries, a terminology based historically on maximising self-interest – the ultimate goal of the diplomat – and on practices through which the rich have almost invariably ended up exploiting the poor, is likely to be counterproductive. In other words, the discussion seemed to confirm that “science diplomacy” has a legitimate place in the formulation and implementation of policies for science (just as there is a time and place for exercising “soft power” in international relations). But the dangers of going beyond this – including the danger of distorting the integrity of science itself, and even alienating potential partners in collaborative projects, particularly in the developing world – were also clearly exposed.

## Artic

### 2NC- No Arctic war

**No war for Norway.**

**Perry and Andersen 12** (<http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/StrategicDynamicsArcticRegion.pdf>, New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region: Implications for National Security and International Collaboration, February 2012, Charles M. Perry and Bobby Andersen. Dr. Perry is vice president and director of studies at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., and vice president of National Security Planning Associates, Inc. Dr. Perry also directs and/or contributes to a number of Institute studies that focus on specific aspects of U.S. defense reform and military transformation to meet post-9/11 security challenges. Dr. Perry holds an M.A. in international affairs, an M.A. in law and diplomacy, and a Ph.D. in international politics from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He has served as an officer in the United States Army Reserve, and is a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS). Bobby Anderson is a research associate at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. She focuses on Nordic affairs, NATO and European security issues, U.S. defense strategy, regional security developments in the Asia-Pacific, changing security dynamics in the Arctic region.)

Looking ahead, Norway is likely to continue its campaign to highlight the importance of High North security and to urge its NATO allies to accord the Arctic a higher priority in Alliance planning. In so doing, Norwegian officials will continue as well to embrace the “High North, low tension” mantra popularized by Foreign Minister Støre, stressing that while the risks of military conflict are minimal at the moment, the potential for rivalry and miscalculation is real and could increase as the Arctic’s sea lanes and its resource potential rise in value. Beyond these considerations, moreover, Oslo will argue that a host of new, less traditional, but nonetheless demanding security challenges are emerging in the High North, including, once oil and gas production in the region really takes off and seaborne trade expands, a need for improved energy security, critical infrastructure protection, disaster response, all-domain awareness, and even anti-piracy and counter-terrorism capabilities, all designed to function well under harsh Arctic conditions. Norway understands that fielding such capabilities is beyond the capacity of any one country, and that collective, multinational efforts – be they at the Nordic, BEAC, Arctic Council, EU, or NATO levels – must be structured in a way that elicits cooperation, rather than resistance, from Moscow. In this sense, the Norwegians will strive, as they have in the past, to maintain a proper balance between asserting national and Alliance rights in 61 Norwegian Mission to the UN, “Agreement on Continental Shelf in the Norwegian Sea,” 2006. Mys Zheleniya Dikson Barents Sea Greenland Greenland Sea Norway Russia Franz Josef Land Svalbard Denmark (Greenland)Norway (Svalbard) continental shelf boundary (2006) Denmark-Norway Maritime Boundary in Greenland Sea Svalbard Treaty Limits 1920 New Strategic Dynamics in the Arctic Region | Norway 49 the Arctic and avoiding unnecessary confrontation with Russia. At the end of the day, however, they will caution against giving the Russians a veto (or appearing to do so via inactivity) over the size, composition, or regularity of any future Allied presence in the Arctic, as the Arctic has always been and will continue to be, in their view, squarely within NATO’s geographic purview.

#### All 1AC authors conclude NEG-

#### Tassinari says the Arctic Council is solving now

**Tassinari ‘12** [Fabrizio Tassinari is a non-resident Senior Fellow at the German Marshall Fund and the Head of Foreign Policy and EU Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies, September 7, 2012, "Avoiding a Scramble for the High North", http://blog.gmfus.org/2012/09/07/avoiding-a-scramble-for-the-high-north/]

For a peaceful Arctic environment to emerge, the political discourse and ensuing practices need rebalancing. Besides abstract musings about the normative virtues of multilateralism, straightforward considerations of enlightened self-interest should justify the drive for cooperation. As The Economist put it in a recent report, “The five Arctic littoral countries … would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have.” Some recent developments point in this direction. The Arctic Council, the main regional forum grouping the littoral countries plus Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, has grown into a premier venue of high-level interaction among Arctic powers. The stature of outsiders queuing up for permanent observer status,including China and the EU, testifies to the growing importance of this body. In 2011, the Council’s members strengthened cooperation on search and rescue operations (a crucial matter for such a territorially vast area). In 2008, the five littoral countries joined together in a statement, the Ilulissat Declaration, by which they committed to settle in an orderly manner disagreements that may arise on issues such as navigation rights and delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf.

#### Talmadge says no escalation and diplomacy checks

**Talmadge ‘12** [Eric, AP, Huffington Post, "Arctic Climate Change Opening Region To New Military Activity’, 4/16, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/16/arctic-climate-change-military-activity_n_1427565.html>]

The U.S., Canada and Denmark held major exercises two months ago, and in an unprecedented move, the military chiefs of the eight main Arctic powers — Canada, the U.S., Russia, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland — gathered at a Canadian military base last week to specifically discuss regional security issues.¶ None of this means a shooting war is likely at the North Pole any time soon. But as the number of workers and ships increases in the High North to exploit oil and gas reserves, so will the need for policing, border patrols and — if push comes to shove — military muscle to enforce rival claims.¶ The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic by 2030 as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, according to a National Research Council analysis commissioned by the U.S. Navy last year.¶ What countries should do about climate change remains a heated political debate. But that has not stopped north-looking militaries from moving ahead with strategies that assume current trends will continue.

#### Tensions lead to cooperation, not war

Aruliah, 9-28-12 [Charles, Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada Post-Graduate research fellow, "The Cold Truth: Why the Arctic isn’t the same as Asia’s island disputes," iPolitics, 9-28-12, www.ipolitics.ca/2012/09/28/charles-aruliah-the-cold-truth-why-the-arctic-isnt-the-same-as-asias-island-disputes/, accessed 10-7-12, mss]

But if one looks past such public displays, it becomes increasingly clear that, unlike territorial disputes in Asia, Arctic relations remains primarily characterized by cooperation rather than conflict. And here’s why: First and foremost, despite the fact that in August, the Arctic melted at an unprecedented 91,700 km2 per day, it remains one of the harshest environments on the planet. While it’s true that sailing through the Arctic could potentially cut the distance for international shipping in half, it can only be achieved during the late summer melt – less than one quarter of the entire year. Even then, ships must be wary of left-over multi-year ice, icebergs, and floating growlers, some of which can be as hard as concrete. Ships hoping to traverse the passage will still require constant monitoring and icebreaker escorts, all of which incur significant additional costs. This is why Arctic states are closely cooperating in areas such as Search and Rescue. Contrast this with the significantly busier Malacca Straits located near the South China Seas, which draws about 50 percent of the world’s oil tanker traffic, and saw some 70,000 transits in 2007 (compared with the Northwest Passage’s 26 in 2010). The East China Sea too, remains a busy waterway and central hub located between some of the world’s busiest ports. In general, the cost of controlling Arctic shipping just isn’t worth the risk of provoking conflict through the exercise of such dominance. Secondly, unlike the Arctic, territorial disputes in East Asia remain intimately linked to historical grievances and nationalistic passions from the region’s conflict-ridden past. South Korea attributes Japanese claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands to its imperial annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1905. China too has argued that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were historically administered by China, until the territories were ‘unfairly’ redistributed to Japan by the post-war powers following Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Throw in other long-standing disputes like China-Taiwan relations and it’s no wonder why mobs of zealous citizens have taken to the streets in anger over supposed incursions of national territory. In the Arctic, the main sources of territorial aggravation exists between long-standing allies (United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea), and peace-minded Middle Powers (Canada and Denmark over Hans Island) whose idea of conflict involves marking territory with a bottle of Schnapps or Canadian Club. Even the ‘Great Power’ of the region, Russia, has gone through great lengths with Norway to settle a 40 year territorial dispute in the Barents Sea which has also laid the foundations for future joint economic ventures in the area. On the contrary, **nationalist rhetoric may actually be driving Arctic cooperation//**. The encroachment of Arctic ‘outsiders’ such as the EU, China, Japan, South Korea and India, some of whom have argued that the Arctic be declared as ‘a common heritage of mankind’ has led Arctic states, who fear losing territorial integrity, to adopt an ‘us vs. them’ mindset. This has partly resulted in the denial of these countries’ applications for permanent observer status in the exclusive Arctic council, the preeminent intergovernmental forum on the Arctic. Finally, the prominence of scientific/environmental issues and community sustainability in Arctic discussions has mitigated potential nationalistic posturing. The Arctic Council remains geared towards Arctic preservation and studying the effects of environmental change – issues where international scientific collaboration is the norm. Furthermore, the Arctic Council’s endeavor to promote the well-being of indigenous communities, as evidenced by the inclusion of six indigenous organizations as permanent participants in Council discussions, means that Arctic issues are dispersed amongst a variety of actors, and are not the sole realm of national governments.

### 2NC- No escalation

#### Arctic conflict won’t escalate

**RIA Novosti ‘11** [Russian National News Agency citing the chairman of the Arctic Council’s Senior Officials Committee, 8/7/11, http://arctic.ru/news/2011/08/there-no-conflict-over-arctic-just-competition-lind-says]

Media coverage of Arctic developments is not always accurate. In the Arctic, there is no conflict, just competition, Gustaf Lind (Sweden), Chairman of the Arctic Council’s Senior Officials Committee, told an international conference. “It is wrong to call the situation in the Arctic a new “cold war,” or “gold rush.” There is no tension between the Arctic states, although each has its own strategy for the region,” – Lind said. Lind averred, “Headlines in the Swedish press like ‘War over the Arctic,’ ‘Five countries are fighting for the Arctic’ or ‘Struggle for Arctic resources’ – do not give an accurate interpretation of what is happening. Yes, there is competition and this is only normal. There is fight for resources – that is a reality.” Lind believes the Arctic Council, comprising eight states, plays a key role in international cooperation. “It has achieved results in resolving climate-related issues, and those related to preventing emergencies at sea and other issues,” –Sweden’s SAO said. Lind says it is time to expand the Arctic Council’s activity, taking it to a higher political level so it is able to implement its ideas. Lind noted that currently there are a great many problems the Arctic countries have to resolve. “These are environmental issues, issues related to transport infrastructure, creating a mechanism to prevent oil leaks, as well as tackling the problems faced by the Arctic’s indigenous peoples.” Sweden’s SAO expressed confidence that, in the near future, the Arctic Council would be able to develop plans for its activities through the next 20-30 years. The international conference “The Northern Route to Strategic Stability and Equal Partnership in the Arctic” takes place on board the Yamal icebreaker as it covers the route from the Varandei Port to the Tiksi Port. Participants of the conference include Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the North Western Federal District Ilya Klebanov, Transport Minister Igor Levitin, Vice President of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexander Nekipelov, heads from the ministries of Regional Development, Foreign Affairs, Natural Resources, Economic Development, Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief, the Federal Security Service, and other federal bodies of executive power. Representatives from the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland have also been invited.

**Won’t escalate**

**Smirnov ‘9** (Alexei Smirnov, @ Defense and Security, 1-23-09 [“The Arctic is Hot,” lexis]

The Arctic faces the threat of armed conflicts, possibly involving Russia, in the years ahead. This conclusion has been arrived at independently by the Danish Institute of Military Studies and Australian Armed Forces analysts. The open part of a classified report from the Australian military says: "The Arctic is melting, and mining on the sea bed is becoming profitable. If disputes over mining rights cannot be resolved by peaceful means, armed force may be used." Similar concerns are expressed in the Danish report. Five countries are claiming areas close to the North Pole: Denmark, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Norway. Four of them are NATO members. "**It's hard to imagine them fighting each other**," said Major Henrik Edig Jorgensen, a co-author of the Danish military report. "Based on available maps of the Arctic regions that Moscow is claiming, up to 70% of their oil and gas reserves would end up in the hands of the Russians. The stakes are too high - they have too much to lose. If the Arctic is full of warships monitoring each other, no oil platforms could be built there. So militarization of the North is not in Moscow's interests." But if there is another situation like the recent five-day war in the Caucasus, and a NATO country is involved, the Arctic could go up in flames.

### CBW

**Can’t disperse bioweapons**

**Smithson 5** (Amy E., PhD, project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”. http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259]

Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include the concentration of agent in the delivery system, the ways in which the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent, and the right dosage to incapacitate or kill human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature, and even exposure to oxygen, all of which can kill the microbes. Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. Drying an agent, however, is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry, which is much easier to produce but a great deal harder to disperse effectively. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

### Enviro

### Leadership

**Failure to ratify LOST is the single greatest factor in US Arctic influence**

**Smith ’11** [Colonel Reginald R. Smith, USAF, is Professor of National Security Affairs and Senior Developmental Education Student (Strategy and Policy) at the Naval War College, “The Arctic: A New Partnership Paradigm or the Next "Cold War"?” <http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-62/JFQ62_117-124_Smith.pdf>]

**The significance of the declaration is paramount to cooperation in that UNCLOS provides the international rallying point for the Arctic states**. 78 Similarly important, **by virtue of the unanimous and strong affirmation of UNCLOS, the declaration effectively delegitimized the notion to administer the Arctic along the lines of an Antarctic-like treaty preserving the notions of sovereignty and resource exploitation in the region**. 79 With U.S. participation and declaration of support for UNCLOS in these venues, **failure to ratify the treaty suggests that U.S. credibility and legitimacy, and hence the ability to build cohesive multilateral partnerships, are appreciably degraded**. This conclusion is illustrated in Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s refusal to join the Proliferation Security Initiative using the U.S. refusal to accede to UNCLOS as their main argument. 80 **Accession to the treaty appears to be a key first step to preserving U.S. vital interests in the Arctic and building necessary credibility for regional and global partnerships in the political spectrum. Equally important to political partnerships in the region are those available through military collaboration of the Arctic nations**.

## Helium

### Heg

**Great power war is a myth – nuclear deterrence and liberal democracies ensure NO conflict is likely to erupt -**

**Ikenberry 11**

#### Europe and BRIC nations counterbalancing

#### Brooks 2012(Rosa, professor of law at Georgetown, fellow at the New America Foundation, February 1, "America's waning influence", http://articles.latimes.com/2012/feb/01/opinion/la-oe-brooks-decline-20120201)

American influence is waning for two reasons, the first of which should potentially be a source of comfort, not despair. While we continue to have the world's most formidable military, America's power in the world is declining simply because once-weak states are growing stronger. Europe, despite its current woes, is an economic and diplomatic force to be reckoned with. China, India and Brazil are emerging as regional powerhouses with increasingly global reach. As a result of "the rise of the rest," U.S. power is declining in a relative sense. In the last decade, for instance, our share of global output dropped from 23.5% to 19.1%. And this is a trend that began decades ago. In his 1987 National Security Strategy, President Reagan noted, "The United States no longer ha[s] an overwhelming economic position vis-a-vis Western Europe and the East Asia rimland." In 1990,President George H.W. Bush echoed this theme in his National Security Strategy: "It was inevitable that our overwhelming economic predominance after the war would be reduced." If Reagan were alive today, conservatives would excoriate him as a declinist. But as Reagan recognized, a decline in relative American power is a good thing, not a bad thing — if we can turn rising states into solid allies. Remember "Gulliver's Travels"? True, it wasn't much fun for Gulliver to be the little guy in the land of Brobdingnagian giants, but it was even less fun to be a giant among the Lilliputians. Like Gulliver, America will prosper most if we can surround ourselves with friendly peer and near-peer states. They give us larger markets and improve burden-sharing; none of the global problems that bedevil us can be solved by the United States alone.

### Terror

### Aerospace

### Antimatter

### Helium

### Solvency

# 1NR

## Russia DA

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#### Turns Arctic stability

**Diplomat ’12** [Diplomat Magazine, “A pugnacious Putin, an assertive Russia,” http://diplomatonline.com/mag/2012/04/a-pugnacious-putin-an-assertive-russia/]

As a major energy supplier to Europe and Asia, Russia is both a potential partner and competitor with Canada and the United States. If Canada succeeds in building its proposed oil pipeline to the Pacific, it will eventually find itself in a high-stakes competition with Russia, and other potential suppliers, in the Chinese market. For two decades, Russia and China have been engaged in near continuous negotiations on the terms of pipeline construction and delivery of Russian natural gas to China. Canada’s entry into the East Asian energy sweepstakes is likely to be viewed by Beijing as yet another source of leverage useful with other potential suppliers, including Russia. Competition for Arctic energy resources will also involve Canada and the United States with Russia. Given its geographic position in the Far North, it is difficult to envisage a cooperative regime for Arctic security and safe and effective development of Arctic energy without a network of bilateral and multilateral arrangements including Russia.

#### Relations solve helium- Russia can alleviate demand

**Gasworld ’12** [“Russia’s helium stock enough for world’s demand – EXCLUSIVE,” July 1, <http://www.gasworld.com/news/russias-helium-stock-enough-for-worlds-demand-exclusive/2000959.article>]

Gasworld can reveal that Russia could soon emerge as a key player in the rapidly depleting helium market after plans were unveiled to annually produce up to 220mcm of the gas from 2018.¶ Speaking exclusively at the historic gasworld South East Asia conference, in Singapore. Gazprom’s Nikita Pozdnyakov made an announcement that could answer the world’s helium shortage.¶ The international issues surrounding helium shortages, which continue to affect businesses around the globe, could soon be a forgotten memory after a spokesman from a Russian company highlighted plans to fill the void left by the US’s plans to sell-off all of the country’s reserves to repay a $1.3 billion debt to the US Treasurey – which has been ordered by US law.¶ The current sales structure distorts the private helium market and is creating uncertainty for industrial, feral, medical and scientific users of the gas.¶ Senators are trying to change the law that stipulates the country’s helium stocks should be sold, to generate stability in the market – for the benefit of all that rely on using the gas.¶ However, these proposed changes can take many years to become law – or could even fail to be made law.¶ Seizing the opportunity for a new business, Pozdnyakov explained Russia has plans to tap into natural stocks and fill the void that will be left by the US and become the world’s largest helium producer.

### Bioweapons

#### US-Russian cooperation solves bioweapons:

Dimitri, **Simes**, President, Nixon Center Federal News Service, Congressional Testimony by the House International Relations Committee, “Hearing on Russia’s Transition to Democracy,” 9-30-**03**,pg. ln

Biological weapons, chemical weapons, they are guarded often by regular so-called internal ministry troops. They are notoriously corrupt. I would not trust them for a second and I think this should be an important priority in our dialogue with Putin. And I think that actually -- obviously we should consider additional funding, but I'm always offended by the notion that they have all these oligarchs, all this incredible wealth, you have all of these hundreds of thousands of new Russians who are going all over Europe spending millions of dollars and somehow they cannot find a way to do what any serious state should be prepared to do.And I think we should tell Mr. Putin that we do believe that it's not only a matter of security, but is a matter of image of his regime and of his seriousness to put these weapons under credible control. And I completely agree that we should have access to them and we should have a better opportunity to observe and to know what is going on, and that is one reason in our report we propose a closer cooperation between Russian and American intelligence services.

### Artic Environment

#### Russian co-op is key to solve the environment

**Rojansky and Collins 10** (Matthew, Deputy Director @ Russia and Eurasia Program @ Carnegie, and James, Director @ Russia and Eurasia Program @ Carnegie, “Why Russia Matters,” 8/18, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=41409>,)

4. Russia's environment matters. As the catastrophic fires across Western Russia have dramatically illustrated, Russia is both a victim of global climate change and a steward of natural resources -- including many of the forests now badly burned -- needed to reverse the global warming trend. With more than one-tenth of the world's total landmass, vast freshwater and ocean resources, plus deposits of nearly every element on the periodic table, Russia is an **indispensable** partner **in the responsible stewardship of the global environment**. On climate change, there is work to be done, but progress is evident. Russia today is the world's fourth-largest carbon emitter, but as a signatory to the Copenhagen Accord, it has pledged to reduce emissions to 20 to 25 percent below 1990 levels. Another black spot is Russia's use of "flaring" -- a technique that burns natural gas into the open atmosphere during oil extraction, but Medvedev agreed to capture 95 percent of the gas currently released through flaring. Last year he also signed Russia's first law on energy efficiency, which takes such steps as requiring goods to be marked according to their energy efficiency and banning incandescent light bulbs after 2014. True, most of Russia's other commitments are short on deadlines and concrete deliverables. But like China's cleanup for the Beijing Olympics, **Moscow could transform resolve into reality with surprising speed, given the right amount of international engagement**. And in the meantime, Russia's natural climate-cleaning properties are vast; the Siberian provinces alone contain more clean oxygen-producing forests and reserves of freshwater than continental Europe.

### Turns Heg

#### US-Russian rivalry undermines US hegemony:

Sergey Karaganov, Dean of the School of the World Economy and International Affairs at the National Research University–Higher School of Economics (NRU-HSE), Мarch 2011, “analytical report by the russian Group of the Valdai international discussion club”, <http://vid-1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/US-Russia%20relations_eng.pdf>

1.11. If the parties resume bitter rivalry or even confrontation, the weakening of Moscow’s and Washington’s international positions will grow faster. There can be no return of history, as some conservative American authors would like to see, if the larger part of the U.S.— Russian agenda is again given to rivalry in regional issues and disputes over global ones. Russia will not «mobilize,» if its confrontation with the United States grows, as many Russian strategists hope. Engrossed in mutual confrontation, Moscow and Washington would have to pay less and less attention to real common threats and challenges. In addition, they would not be able to build a multilateral partnership to counter new challenges collectively, which is so vital for themselves and the whole world.

### Turns Science Diplomacy

COAPT

### UQ- Arctic ties strong

#### US-Russia Arctic policy will be cooperative now- provides cover for smooth overall relations

**Klotz 12-12**-12 [Frank Klotz is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., and the author of America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues, “The U.S.-Russian Antarctic Thaw,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-us-russian-antarctic-thaw-7837]

The United States teamed up with Russia for the first time in January 2012 for a short-notice visit to research stations belonging to New Zealand, Italy and France. As with all previous inspections, no concerns about compliance with the arms-control tenets of the treaty were identified.¶ Nine months later, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov signed a Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in Antarctica during the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Vladivostok. Noting that the two countries conduct some of the most extensive and diverse scientific activities in Antarctica, the memo specifically called for reinforcing cooperative activities already taking place in the region, including continuing joint inspections of the facilities of other countries in Antarctica. Accordingly, this month the United States and Russia carried out an even more ambitious inspection together, visiting six stations belonging to India, Belgium, Japan, Norway and China. Their findings will be reported jointly at the next plenary meeting of the all the consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty scheduled for May 2013, in Brussels, Belgium.¶ The fact that the United States and Russia have joined forces in conducting inspections under the Antarctic Treaty is a relatively modest achievement in the larger scheme of things. But it does provide an opportunity for the United States and Russia to work together on an important area of common interest—both at the diplomatic level and, perhaps even more importantly, at the level of scientific and technical experts. At the same time, it helps facilitate a continuing dialogue between leaders of both countries while the thornier issues in the bilateral relationship are being resolved.

#### US-Russia Arctic cooperation is high now- bilateral efforts

**Klotz 12-12**-12 [Frank Klotz is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C., and the author of America on the Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues, “The U.S.-Russian Antarctic Thaw,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-us-russian-antarctic-thaw-7837]

Thus, a recent bit of bilateral cooperation comes as welcome news. On Monday, the State Department announced that a joint U.S.-Russian team had just concluded a ten-day inspection of six different research stations in Antarctica. The inspection was conducted under the auspices of the Antarctic Treaty, a fifty-three-year-old agreement that governs activities on the icy continent, and its subsequent 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection.

### Link

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#### The plan causes land competition- kills relations and causes war, leaked intel proves

**Merchant ’11** [Brian, climate and energy writer, has written for Slate, Paste, Salon, GOOD, and the Huffington Post, “WikiLeaks: Rush to Drill in Arctic is Stirring Military Tensions with Russia,” May 12, http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility/wikileaks-rush-to-drill-in-arctic-is-stirring-military-tensions-with-russia.html]

The latest batch of Wikileaks cables reveals that there's an ongoing rush to "carve up" the Arctic for resources between the states that border it. The cables detail brewing tensions, especially between the United States, Canada, and Russia. They show fault lines within NATO itself, and some ambassadors have expressed concerns that the race to claim the resource-rich territory -- remember, the US Geological Survey estimates that there's as much oil off the coast of Greenland as there is in the North Sea -- will lead to military conflict in the near future. Greenpeace contacted me with their parsings of the leaked cables (I hope to have time to dig deeper into them a bit later), and here's some of what they found:¶ A cable numbered 12958 details a conversation between US diplomats and then Danish foreign minister Moeller, in which they discuss delays in US ratification of a key maritime convention. "If you stay out," Moeller is quoted as telling the Americans, "then the rest of us will have more to carve up in the Arctic.¶ A 2010 cable (number 248929) quotes Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitriy Rogozin saying: "The twenty-first century will see a fight for resources, and Russia should not be defeated in this fight ... NATO has sensed where the wind comes from. It comes from the North."¶ A 2007 cable (number 129049) shows how the U.S, is positioning to take advantage of any oil strike off Greenland. The cable states: "Greenland is on a clear track toward independence, which could come more quickly than most outside the Kingdom of Denmark realize... With Greenlandic independence glinting on the horizon, the U.S. has a unique opportunity to shape the circumstances in which an independent nation may emerge. We have real security and growing economic interests in Greenland, for which existing Joint and Permanent Committee mechanisms (described reftel A) may no longer be sufficient. American commercial investments, our continuing strategic military presence, and new high-level scientific and political interest in Greenland argue for establishing a small and seasonal American Presence Post in Greenland's capital as soon as practicable...¶ Cable 208631 (from 2009) states the U.S. belief that "Behind Russia's (Arctic) policy are two potential benefits accruing from global warming: the prospect for an (even seasonally) ice-free shipping route from Europe to Asia, and the estimated oil and gas wealth hidden beneath the Arctic sea floor... Despite on-going efforts to renew U.S.-Russian relations, some Russian voices have called the situation in the Arctic a ""cold peace"" vis-a-vis NATO and the U.S. In April 2008, Russian Navy head Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky said, ""While in the Arctic there is peace and stability, however, one cannot exclude that in the future there will be a redistribution of power, up to armed intervention...¶ One of the most striking things about the Wikileaks cables has been just how much senior diplomats and power brokers actually sound like Bond villains or caricatures of cigar-chomping fat cats. Some of these reported statements just need a bit of Vincent Price-esque cackling afterward to be pushed into B-list suspense film territory.¶ Besides that, Wikileaks has provided yet another invaluable peak into how governments work when nobody's looking. It shouldn't surprise anyone that disputes over territory in the oil-rich Arctic -- at a time when demand for the black gold is surging and supply is dwindling -- should cause military strategists to worry. Nor will it likely surprise anyone that the US is repulsively circling Greenland like a vulture, waiting for it to declare independence so our oil companies can swoop in an monopolize the region.

#### The plan is seen as rogue land-grabbing and a threat to Russian identity

**Baev ’11** [Pavel K. Baev is a research professor at the Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), and nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at Brookings Institute, “Russia's High Ambitions and Ambivalent Activities in the Arctic,” June 3, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles\_papers\_reports/0104.html]

The tentative shift to cooperation from geopolitical competition (which appeared real in the late-2000s, but was actually rather experimental) has been driven not by Moscow's principled pro-Western choice, but rather by opportunism. It is not so much the immediate benefits from cooperation that prompted this shift, but rather the concern that a defiant stance could convince neighbors to overcome their differences and gang up against Russia. So Moscow demonstrates commitment to strengthening the Arctic Council, while at the same time indicating a preference for networking with the narrower format of the Arctic Five. Moscow also objects to engaging observers in the decision-making in these institutions, even if that means offending close partners like the EU or China.13 ¶ Russia's engagement in cooperative work remains uneven. Some key guidelines , such as upholding the rights of indigenous peoples remains of little interest to it, while, for example, joint efforts at upgrading search-and-rescue capabilities are seen as meaningful, but politically marginal. A major underlying assumption for building closer ties with neighbors is, however, the approval of the claim for expanding Russia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by about 1.2 million km2 beyond the shelves of the Chukotka and East Siberian seas, right up to the North Pole. Russia was the first state to submit a claim to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UN CLCS) in December 2001, and to experience a disappointment as the application was returned for re-working due to insufficient scientific evidence.14 ¶ In the aftermath of the sensational flag-planting expedition in August 2007, Putin declared that all the necessary proof was collected, so the claim was substantiated beyond a doubt. The application, nevertheless, has not been re-submitted; the deadline is now provisionally set for 2013, while the list of claims at the UN CLCS currently stands at 56 (with only 11 recommendations being adopted).15 It might appear perplexing that, after so much political boasting, Moscow is dragging its feet about pushing its claim. But there are indeed problems related to establishing the geologic nature of the Mendeleev and Lomonosov ridges, caused by the lack of data from deep-water drilling, beyond currently available technical capabilities. The UN CLCS cannot adopt a decision on disputed EEZs. So Russia seeks to coordinate positions with Denmark and Canada, so that the three claims be submitted in a perfectly coherent way.16 Moscow also expects that Norway, whose claim was largely approved by the UN CLCS in March 2009, would refrain from raising any issues. This is not only because the maritime border dispute has been amicably resolved, but also because its sovereignty over the Svalbard/Spitsbergen remains a matter of interpretation.17 ¶ The most problematic and puzzling obstacle for the revised Russian claim, from Moscow's point of view, is the position of the United States. The Russian Foreign Ministry is painfully aware that the unfavorable response to the move made in 2001 was in large measure influenced by a letter from the U.S. State Department to the UN CLCS that mercilessly revealed the shortcomings of the sloppily prepared document.18 Moscow is also aware that Washington is not planning to join the UN Convention on the Law of the SEA (UNCLOS) anytime soon.19 The reasons why the ratification of this major international treaty in the U.S. Senate is impracticable are so incomprehensible for an observer with limited exposure to the internal working of this legislature that hidden motives and evil intentions are explanations that seem more credible to Russian analysts and politicians. ¶ The significance of the yet-to-be-submitted claim for the inaccessible Arctic shelf goes beyond its potential and (highly doubtful) economic exploitation, or its practically non-existent strategic value. In some indeterminable but irreducible way, Arctic matters pertain to Russia's identity, which remains in the limbo created by the collapse of the USSR. This connection is what determines the rather mixed feelings about the Russian-Norwegian border settlement, while the USSR-USA maritime boundary agreement (1990) is typically seen as a betrayal of national interests.20 The substance of popular perceptions of the Arctic is vague, but in general terms they are much more about "conquering" and asserting sovereignty over the Arctic, rather than protecting its fragile ecology.¶ Conclusion¶ The notion of "geopolitical confrontation" in the Arctic belongs not to the realm of Realpolitik, where the balances of competing national interests are determined by measurable power-projecting capabilities, but to the sphere of virtual politics, with its fluid interplays of discourses and identities. Material stakes are not very high in this post-modern type of state interaction; but political passions could still run high, while popular perceptions could be exploited by current populist maneuvering. In this rich variety of perspectives one misleading proposition that lingers on, despite the established political wisdom, is that of the Arctic as a "no-man's-land" Bonanza, where no rules apply and natural resources are up for grabs.¶ In fact, all inter-state and non-governmental interactions in this region are sufficiently regulated by national and international laws, including the UNCLOS, and coordinated by a number of over-lapping institutions, first of all the Arctic Council. Russia, which is often portrayed as a rogue player, partakes in the working of these institutions in exemplary fashion, is actually following every rule, forsaking unilateralism even in laying a claim for an extended EEZ. Nevertheless, beneath this cooperative course lies an underlying concern about interests of competitors, as well as about hostile intentions of the Atlantic Alliance. These suspicions are strengthened by the U.S. non-ratification of the UN CLOS. Moscow dislikes the notion of the Arctic as a "global common" and aims at dividing it between the Arctic Five while making use of several exclusive regional structures.¶ The inescapable problem with the desire to assert sovereignty over the largest part of the Arctic is the weakness of the Russian state, with its economic vulnerability and political backwardness. The needs of economic modernization, increasingly internalized by elites, prescribe massive investments in high-tech industries and techno-parks; these preclude a mobilization of resources and attention to developing the Arctic. A key precondition of an economic revival is modernization of the "enlightened authoritarian" political system, which has a particular interest in channeling budget funding towards Arctic programs, due to plentiful opportunities for misappropriation and graft. Russia's current trajectory of economic and political stagnation is unsustainable, and a modernization breakthrough is both necessary and feasible. But such a breakthrough would—somewhat paradoxically—cut down on ambitions for an Arctic "re-conquest."

### Links- Icebreakers

#### Russia views icebreakers as a threat to influence- independently causes nuclear war

**Cohen ’10** [Ariel, PhD, Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation, “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic Policy,” June 15, <http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2421.pdf>]

**Russia** is continuing its efforts. It **followed up by sending a scientific mission with a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two mini-submarines to the area**. During this meticulously organized media event, the mission planted a titanium Russian flag on the ocean’s floor at the Lomonosov Ridge after collecting soil samples that supposedly prove that the ridge is a continuation of the Eurasian landmass. The U.S. has objected to these claims and stated that they have “major flaws.” 25 **To advance its position, Russia has undertaken a three-year mission to map the Arctic**. 26 The Kremlin is also moving rapidly to establish a comprehensive sea, ground, and air presence. Under Putin, Russia focused on the Arctic as a major natural resources base. The Russian national leadership insists that the state, not the private sector, must take the lead in developing the vast region. The Kremlin published its Arctic doctrine in March 2009. 27 **The main goal is to transform the Arctic into Russia’s strategic resource base and make Russia a leading Arctic power by 2020**. Russian Militarization of the Arctic. The military is an important dimension of Moscow’s Arctic push. The policy calls for creating “general purpose military formations drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation” as well as “other troops and military formations [most importantly, border units] in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security under various military and political circumstances.” 28 These formations will be drawn from the armed forces and from the “power ministries” (e.g., the Federal Security Service, Border Guard Service, and Internal Ministry). Above all, the policy calls for a coast guard to patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries. **Russia views the High North as a major staging area for a potential nuclear confrontation with the U**nited **S**tates **and has steadily expanded its military presence in the Arctic** since 2007. This has included resuming air patrols over the Arctic, including strategic bomber flights. 29 During 2007 alone, Russian bombers penetrated Alaska’s 12-mile air defense zone 18 times. 30 **The Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War, increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s submarines**. Russia is also reorienting its military strategy to meet threats to the country’s interests in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf. 31Russia is also modernizing its Northern Fleet. During 2008 and 2009, **Russian icebreakers regularly patrolled in the Arctic.** **Russia has the world’s largest polar-capable icebreaker flotilla, with 24 icebreakers. Seven are nuclear**, including the 50 Years of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world. 32 Russia plans to build new nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015. 33 **Moscow clearly views a strong icebreaker fleet as a key to the region’s economic development**.

### AT: Deterence key

### AT: Rels collapse inev.

#### Arctic cooperation is key to the relations reset

**Antrim ‘12** [Caitlyn Antrim is the Executive Director of the Rule of Law Committee for the Oceans and a Stimson Affiliate, “Relocating The Reset: US-Russian Partnership In The Arctic,” March 1, http://www.stimson.org/spotlight/relocating-the-reset-us-russian-partnership-in-the-arctic/]

In January, when a US Coast Guard icebreaker escorted a Russian tanker carrying essential fuel to Nome, Alaska, it served as a reminder that the US and Russia have many reasons to continue pursuing a thaw in relations. Unfortunately, beyond the New START agreement and a few other deals, the US-Russia reset, which was announced with fanfare in 2009, seems to have descended into bureaucratic obscurity. While it is essential that the United States maintains a constructive relationship with the Russian federal government, there is much more to be gained in developing working relationships that extend to regional governments, nongovernmental organizations, and indigenous people as well, in order to address cooperation not only in security affairs but also in economics, trade, science, and environmental conservation.¶ Two expert assessments of the limitations of the reset are particularly insightful. In December 2010, Deana Arsenian and Andrey Kortunov noted in World Politics Review that while New START represented a major accomplishment, the reset had so far failed to lay the foundation of a durable relationship that reached deeply into the two societies. A year later, former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov blamed the entrenched geopolitical mindset of the political intelligentsia in both capitals for protecting status quo views left over from the Cold War and creating a barrier to greater implementation of the reset.¶ Building a better, more effective relationship with Russia is too important to allow ties to be derailed by changes of leadership in both capitals. Unfortunately, a new approach may not be possible given election year politics in Washington and Moscow, and certainly not when the reset is focused principally on presidents, prime ministers, and Cabinet members.¶ Instead, the US-Russia relationship can be strengthened by opening a new front that engages governments, businesses, and civil society at regional and local levels in addressing issues of economics, environment, and quality of life. Just such an opportunity can be found in the Arctic, where both countries share a frontier as well as the challenge of managing the arctic environment as climate change makes the region more accessible.¶ Cooperation is already occurring in the Arctic, specifically the area between the North Pole and the Bering Strait along the antimeridian and the coasts of the Russian Far East, Alaska, and Canada. Beyond the high-level forum of the Arctic Council, where national governments and indigenous people are represented, there is a history during the past two decades of relationship building at the state and local levels, spearheaded by Alaskan and Russian governors. Issues of fisheries, Bering Strait shipping, regional development, and environmental protection have led to increased regional cooperation.¶ But differences in language and culture, business practices and law, and, most of all, legacies of nearly a century of national distrust have left these local ties in dire need of their own reset. Given the region's distance from the two countries' national capitals, political leaders and entrenched intelligentsia, ownership of this kind of initiative should be devolved to state and provincial leaders, indigenous people, civil society organizations, and businesses, with encouragement and support from national governments and intergovernmental organizations.¶ The countries of the antimeridianal Arctic, which is effectively separated from the more economically developed regions of the Barents and Kara seas, stand to gain from a regional partnership that addresses their common interests and concerns. Russia sees the opportunity to develop its vast Arctic watershed, which is becoming accessible with the rejuvenation of the Northern Sea Route across its Arctic coast. Alaska wants to capture benefits in energy development and trans-Arctic trade. The Canadian territories stand to gain from increased mineral development. All three countries have common interests in sustainable fisheries, a clean environment, and protection of native cultures.¶ These interests can open opportunities for regional cooperation toward a new and productive future for the people of eastern Russia and North America. But cooperation without structure runs the risk of being ad hoc and ineffective. That's why such an initiative should take the form of a regional council representing the states, territories, and populations of the antimeridianal Arctic to identify problems and implement solutions that benefit the people of the region and the nations themselves. In addition to developing a durable partnership across Russia, Alaska, and northern Canada, a regional council should be a partner to the high-level Arctic Council, providing it with local insight and advice, and with assistance in implementation of its recommendations in ways most compatible with local and regional concerns.¶ The antimeridianal Arctic provides a promising new front on which to reinvigorate the U.S.-Russia reset. Far from the centers of national government and politics, local governments and peoples may provide more stable and continuous leadership. Issues of economic development and environmental protection can provide common focus, in contrast to the competitive aspects of national security and great power politics. The participation of Canada's northern territories can moderate the inevitable spillover of Washington-Moscow politics into the development of a regional partnership for the antimeridianal Arctic. So, too, would the overarching interests of the Arctic Council and other international organizations - as well as multinational businesses, environmental organizations, and indigenous people's organizations that transcend national borders - help develop a new partnership in the Arctic. For the sake of the Arctic as well as for East-West relations, the three federal governments should encourage and support the creation of such a council and recognize that regional leadership will be the key to its success.

#### Their ev. not assume recent meetings boost relations – Kerry/Donilon visit, Lavrov-Biden meeting, mutual will, non-prolif, counter-terror, drug war, war on crime

Radyuhin 2/3 – the Moscow correspondent of The Hindu (Vladmir, “Biden-Lavrov meet tries revival of ‘reset’,” http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/russia-us-vow-to-mend-relations/article4375091.ece)

Newly-appointed U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry may visit Russia shortly as Moscow and Washington are trying to mend their strained relations. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced Mr. Kerry’s visit after meeting U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden at an international conference in Munich on Saturday. “Biden confirmed to me that Kerry has received my invitation to visit Moscow and expects to make use of it soon,” Mr. Lavrov told Russian media aboard his plane from Munich to Moscow. Mr. Lavrov also said U.S. National Security Advisor Tom Donilon plans to visit Moscow shortly, “probably this month”. The visits will give the two sides an opportunity to ease tensions caused in recent months by disagreements over human rights and Syria. The U.S. enraged the Kremlin by passing a law in December that bars U.S. entry to Russians blamed for the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and other human rights abuses. Russia retaliated imposing similar sanctions against Americans accused of violating human rights and banning the adoption of Russian children by Americans. The two countries have also been at odds over the conflict in Syria, with Russia strongly critical of U.S. support for armed rebels and Washington blaming Moscow for backing Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad. However, the meeting between Mr. Lavrov and Mr. Biden, the first high-level contact between Russia and the U.S. after President Barack Obama’s re-election, appeared to have revived the spirit of the ‘reset’, which the U.S. Vice-President had also proclaimed in Munich four years ago. Emerging from the meeting Mr. Lavrov said the two sides had agreed that differences and problems should be resolved on the basis of equality and respect for mutual interests. Solutions “There is an understanding on both sides, that along with differences that need to be addressed to find mutually acceptable solutions, we have very many common interests in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fight against terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime,” Russia’s top diplomat said. “We also need to cooperate more closely in Afghanistan as NATO is leaving…” “We have a shared understanding with Washington that it’s very difficult to get anything done without Russia and the United States on an overwhelming majority of international problems,” Mr. Lavrov further noted.